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I.  FOREWORD 
The  Directorate General  for  Economic  and  Financial 
Affairs  (Directorate  A)  is presently  undertaking  an  examination 
of  the medium-term  economic  trends and  problems,  as  well  as 
related policy  issues,  for  the  individual  member  countries of 
the Community.  These  studies  may  be  considered extensions of 
the analytical  reports  which  the  Commission  services prepared 
as  supporting  material  for  the  Fifth  medium-term  economic  policy 
programme.  They  remain  the  sole  responsibility of the 
Commission's  services and  are not  intended to have  a  normative 
character. 
In  many  respects the economic  outlook  for  the European 
Community  is none  too bright.  Common  worrying  features  for 
most  countries are  :  Low  growth,  high  unemployment,  inflationary 
pressures,  Lack  of balance  in the external  accounts,  high 
government  deficit,  decline  in productivity growth,  Loss  of 
competitiveness,  high  wage  costs and  pressure on  company  profits, 
Low  investment  and  slow  adaptation of  the  structure of economic 
activity to a  rapidly  changing  environment. 
Policy makers  in the United  Kingdom  face  most  if not 
all of  these difficulties.  The  present  report  is written  with 
a  view  to identify the  specific  British problems  and  to illustrate 
these  by  appropriate  references to the  situation  in other  Member 
States of the  Community. 
The  report  has  been  written  for  a  general  public,  and 
in particular  for  non-British  readers,  who  may  require  comparative 
information  on  the  Longer-term  economic  trends and  problems  in 
the United Kingdom.  In order  to keep  the  size of  the paper 
manageable  it has  been  necessary to be  selective,  concentrating 
the main  emphasis  on  the  real  side of the economy.  This  is not -10-
to  say  that  the  financial  side of  the  economy  is unimportant  and 
it must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  present Government  has  stated 
that  without  a  reduction  in  inflation and  more  stable financial 
conditions there will  be  no  -lasting  improvement  in the underlying 
economic  performance  of the  United Kingdom. -11-
II.  THE  MEDIUM-TERM  EVOLUTION  OF  THE  UK  ECONOMY 
Output  and  the  use  of  resources 
Over  ·the  last  two  decades  the performance  of  the  UK 
economy  has  been  less  satisfactory than that  of other  European 
countries;  the  UK  has  suffered  from  a  slower  rate of  economic 
growth  and  a  slower  increase  in  living  standards  than  elsewhere. 
Associated with  and  partly  accounting for this poor  growth 
performance  has  been  a  low  rate of growth  of  fixed  investment 
and  an  inadequate  capital stock,  which  in turn  is  an  important 
factor  in explaining  the  low  rate of growth  of  labour  productivi-
ty.  The  latter,  when  combined  with  the  UK's  tendancy  to above 
average  wage  inflation,  has  placed downward  pressure upon  invest-
ment  profitability, so  further  reducing  the  incentive to  invest. 
As  a  result  of these developments  the  UK  economy  has 
remained  weak  in the  face  of external  competition,  both  in do-
mestic  and  in third markets,  and  the external position  has  been 
vulnerable to even  relatively modest  rates  of growth  of output 
and  demand. 
The  longer-term performance  of  the  UK  with  regard to 
growth,  employment  and  productivity is set  down  in Table  II.1 
where  figures  are also given  for  the  Community  as  a  whole  (EC  10> 
and  for  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  (a  country  with  which 
the  UK  is  compared  in this document  although  it must  be  recog-
nised that  the  economies  are distinctly different  in  many  re-
spects). 
It  can  be  seen  that  with  regard to both  the overall 
growth  of output  and  the growth  of  manufacturing  production,  the 
UK's  performance  was  well  below  that of the  FR  of  Germany  and 
EC  10,  in the period to 1973.  At  the  same  time  the growth  of 
output  per  head  (total productivity)  was  much  slower,  but  the 
rate  of  unemployment  was  close to that  in  the rest  of  the 
Community. -12-
From  1974  onwards,  ~s the  Western  economies  adjusted to 
the first oil price  shock,  the  UK  continued to perform  less sa-
tisfactorily than other  countries.  Indeed,  the output  of  manu-
facturing  industry actually fell  at  an  average  annual  rate of 
almost  2 % in  the  six  years  to 1980,  and  the  rate of decline 
foreseen  for  1980  and  1981  taken  together  (almost  17  %),  is 
significantly greater  than  that  recorded  between  1929  and  1931 
at  the  time  of the  Great  Depression  (1).  At  the  same  time total 
employment  declined,  unemployment  rose  well  above  the  Community 
average,and the growth  of productivity  continued to be  far  more 
sluggish  than  elsewhere.  These  developments  occured  as  the  UK 
was  undergoing  an  important  structural  change,  namely  its emer-
gence,  by  the  end  of the nineteen seventies,  as  a  significant 
producer  of  crude oil.  To  show  the  importance  of  North  Sea  oil 
Table  II.1  gives official estimates  of  GOP  growth  that  exclude 
crude oil output.  As  Graph  11.1  shows  on  this  basis  the  level 
of  GOP,  at  mid-1981,  was  no  greater  than  in  1975. 
However,  in contrast  to the  movements  in output,  real  na-
tional disposable  income  (2)  and  in particular  real  personal 
disposable  income  (RPDI),  advanced  significantly faster  than  GDP 
from  1974  onwards  (see  Table  11.2).  At  the  same  time  GDP  per 
head  in  the UK,  measured  in  European  Currency  Units  (Ecu),  has 
once again approached  the  average  for  the  Community  as  a  result 
of  favourable  exchange  rate movements.  The  growth  of  real  in-
comes  was  particularly  rapid  in  1978  and  1979  while  in  1980  RPDI 
rose  by  2 % at  a  time  when  GOP  fell  by  3  %.  These  movements  in 
(1)  By  1931  manufacturing  output  had  fallen to  11  % below  the 
1929  level.  A very  modest  recovery  was  recorded  in  1932 
(Feinstein,  1972). 
(2)  Real  national  disposable  income  differs  from  GDP  in  that  it 
takes  account  of net  property income from  abroad  and  net  trans-
fers  abroad,  together  with  changes  in  the  terms  of trade. 
An  improvement  in  the  terms  of  trade  means  that  a  given  volume 
of  domestic  output  can  be  exchanged  for  a  ~rger volume  of 
overseas output  (imports). -13-
real  incomes  were  reflected  in  the behaviour  of private  consump-
tion.  Between  1979  and  1981  private  consumption. is forecast  to 
rise by  3  1/2%  and  GDP  to fall  by  3  1/4%  <see  Table  11.2). 
These  developments  may  also be  considered a  reflection of the 
structural  change  caused  by  increased  North  Sea  oil output  which, 
it can  be  argued,  partly accounted  for  the  marked  appreciation 
of the sterling exchange  rate.  This  benefited  real  incomes  sig-
~ificantly  so  helping  to  strengthen  consumer  spending.  Whilst 
consumption  advanced,  fixed  investment  in  the  UK  declined  some-
what  between  1974  and  1980,  compared  to a  modest  expansion  else-
where.  Although  this  was  partly due  to the  marked  fall  in gene~ 
ral government  fixed  investment,  reduced  by  successive govern-
ments  in  their efforts  to bring public  expenditure  under  control, 
the performance  of  manufacturing  investment  was  also  relatively 
disappointing.  The  contrasting movements  of output, private con-
sumption  and  investment  are set  down  in  Graph  11.1  and  in  Table 
11.3. 
Besides  having  a  significant  impact  on  the structure of 
production,  North  Sea  oil output  has  also  affected the  ex-
ternal position and  Government  revenues.  By  the middle  of  1980 
the  UK 1s  balance of trade  in  crude oil  had  moved  into marked 
surplus  although  the  more  detailed analysis further  below 
suggests that, for  1980  as  a  whole,  the  balance of payments  for 
all  North  Sea  operations  is  likely to  have  remained  modestly  in 
deficit  (3).  The  contribution of  North  Sea  production  tog.overn-
ment  revenues  has  also become  significant  with  oil production 
related forms  of taxation  reaching  some  6  % of total  government 
revenues  in  1980. 
(3)  Jhe balance of  payments  for  all~North Sea  operations  covers 
trade  in  crude oil plus  capital  and  service  it~ms related to 
North  Sea  production and  exploration  (European  Economy  No.  8, 
March  1980,  pp.  88-90). -14-
Incomes  and  prices 
For  over  a  decade  there  has  been  a  tendency  for  the  UK 
to  suffer  higher  rates of  inflation than  its European  trading 
partners.  The  divergence became  particularly marked  ·in  the 
six  years  to 1980  (4)  (see  Table  II.4). However, the data points 
to  a  substantial  easing  of  inflationary pressure from  mid-1980 
onwards  and  in  1981  the  UK  rate of  consumer  price  inflation moved 
toward  the  average  for  the  Community. 
An  analysis  of  average  annual  rates of  consumer  price ·in-
flation  tends  to obscure  one  feature of  the  UK's  recent  inflatio-
nary  experience,  namely  the extent  to which  changes  in  consumer 
prices  have  moved  sharply,  year  by  year,  around  the  annual  ave-
rage.  These  deviations  from  the  trend  value  are significantly 
greater  than  those  recorded  in  the  F.R.  of  Germany  and  for 
the  Community  as  a  whole  (see Table  II.S  and  Graph  II.3). 
Table  II.6 sets out  the  contribution of the  main  inputs 
to the  rise  in  the price deflator of total  final  expenditure  (con-
sumption  plus  investment  plus exports).  The  table clearly  shows 
that  labour  co~ts grew  significantly faster  than prices  from  1978 
onwards,  with  the  consequent  growth  of  real  earnings  well  in  ex-
cess of the growth  of  labour  productivity  (see  Table  II.1).  On 
the other  hand  the strength  of  sterling had  a  moderating  effect 
on  inflation  in  both  1978  and  1980.  The  marked  increase  in  im-
port prices  in  1979  reflects the  second  oil price crisis.  The 
table also  shows  that  in  the period  covered,net  taxes on  expen-
diture  have  increased at  a  faster pace  than  the  rate on  inflation 
itself.  Indeed  increases  in  indirect  taxation  have  been  so  marked 
in  recent  years,  that  the proportion of  indirect  tax  revenues  in 
(4)  From  an  analysis of  the  historical data it can  be  argued that, 
over  the  much  longer  term,  the  UK  has  experienced  lower  rates 
of  inflation than  most  other  industrialised countries  (Smith, 
1981). ~) 
-15-
GDP,  at  17,5 % in  1980,  is  higher  than  in other  Community  coun-
tries  (with the  exception of  Denmark  and  Ireland)  and  significantly 
higher than the 13,8%  average  for  the  Community  as  a  whole  in  1980 
(European  Economy  No.  9,  July  1981,  Ch  9).  In  1979-1980  the 
small  contribution of gross  trading profits  limited the  increase 
in  prices  Csee  Table II.6).  Thus  the  strength  of ster-
ling,  which  sharpened  competition  in both_jnternal  and  external 
markets,  and  relatively  rapid  wage  inflation,  led to a  substantial 
reduction  in profit margins  so  exerting  considerable  downward 
pressure on  the profitability of  investment.  As  a  consequence, by 
early  1981  the  real  rate of  return on  the  capital of  (non  North 
Sea)  industrial  and  commercial  companies  had  fallen to 2 %,  the 
lowest  level  recorded  over  the past  two  decades  (Bank  of  England 
Quarterly Bulletin,  September  1981,  p.  318). 
Public  sector price  increases  have  been  far greater than 
those  in  the private sector.  This  has  arisen partly because  of 
the  monopoly  position of  nationalised  industries,  and  partly be-
cause  of the  financial  constraints  imposed  upon  them  by  the autho-
rities as  a  general  element  of their  firm~onetary and  fiscal  po-
licies.  As  a  consequence  some  have  been  led to argue  that  it is 
the  unsatisfactory  behaviour  of nationalised  industries that  has 
helped to fuel  inflation  (Johnson,  1981). 
Such  analyses  help  to illustrate aspects  of  the  inflatio-. 
nary  process  but  do  not  reveal  much  about  the  fundamental  causes 
of  inflation itself.  Indeed  the  underlying  causes  of  inflation 
are still much  disputed.  One  major  school  of  thought  is that  in-
flation  is the  result  of excessive  monetary  expansion,  resulting 
from  or  assisted by,  excessive  levels of public  sector expendi-
ture or borrowing  (Smith,  1981;  Beenstock,  1980).  These  views 
have  formed  the basis of the anti-inflationary policies of  UK 
Governments  since 1976.  In  particular official target  ranges  for 
the growth  of  the  monetary  aggregates  have  been  announced  since 
mid-1976  with  a  view  to  influencing  inflationary expectations. -16-
Nevertheless, there is no  general  agreement  amongst  economists,  as 
to the  mechanisms  by  which  monetary  and  fiscal  control  reduces 
the  rate of  inflation, particularly in  the  UK  case,  where  it 
has  been  argued  that  the  institutional structure of the  financial 
markets  is not  ideal  for  the  implementation  of monetary  policies. 
Indeed,  shifts of  sentiment  in  financial  markets  have  on  occasion 
led to difficulties in  implementing  monetary  policy.  However,  it 
is now  widely  accepted that  a  firm  monetary  and  fiscal  policy 
provides a  necessary though  not  a  suffici~nt basis  for  reducing 
the  rate of  inflation. 
Most  explanations of  inflation that  do  not  depend  upon 
monetary  phenomena  may  be  termed  institutional.  ·Thus  it can  be 
argued  that  it  is the existence of  large  institutions  in  the  UK 
(nationalised industries  and  trade unions)  which  exert  monopo-
ly  power  in  the  labour  and  product  markets  capable of  overcoming 
monetary  and  fiscal  restraint,  which  has  led to build  up  of  infla-
tionary pressures  (5).  Those  who  subscribe to this view  of  infla-
tion usually propose  that  inflationary pressures should  be  over-
come  by  prices  and  incomes  policies.  Indeed  between  1976  and  1979 
the authorities obtained the  agreement  of  the  Trade  Union  movement 
to a  voluntary  incomes  policy  ('Social  Contract')  with  a  view  to 
limiting  wage- inflation.  Some  have  argued,  however,  that  such 
arrangements  aggravate  the situtation, since  wages  policies are 
normally expressed  in the form  of  an  agreed  average  annual  in-
crease  in  earnings,  and  in  the bargaining process this  rapidly 
became  a  minimum  increase.  Price policies  can  also be  criticised 
on  the grounds  that  they  lead  to market  distortions and  to the 
misallocation of  resources,  thereby  adding  to inflation  in  the 
longer  term.  Related to the  institutional point  of  view  are those 
(5)  A particularly strident  statement of this position  is  con-
tained  in ••International  Currency  Review, 1981, pp. 78-84". -17-
who  argue  that  money  wage  inflation adjust  downwards  with  great 
difficulty and  that  inflation can  only  be  reduced  by  Lowering  unit 
Labour  costs,  and  to do  this output  must  be  increased  (Cambridge 
Economic  Policy  Review,  April  1981). 
From  an  analysis of  the movements  in  the  rate of  infla-
tion since  1976  when  the authorities  began  to  base  their anti-
inflation strategy on  firm  monetary  and  fiscal policies, it is 
not  possible to point  to one  or other explanation of  inflation 
as  being  the  correct  one.  Some  would  argue  that  the fall  in 
the  rate of  inflation between  1980  and  1981  is the  result  of 
monetary  policy and  in particular of  the slow-growth  of the 
money  supply  as narrQwly  defined  <Metzler  1·981>.  Others  would 
argue  that the strength· bf sterling was  the major  factor  in 
reducing  inflation  (to which  Table  II.6 gives  some  support) 
and  is  in  turn partly the  result  of  an  important  structural 
change,  namely  the emergence  of  the  UK  as  an  oil producer.  Yet 
again  the  sharp  fall  in  output  and  employment  in the  UK  in 
1980  and  1981  is  likely to have  Limited  the monopoly  power  of 
certain institutions, so  moderating  inflationary pressures. 
It  is perhaps  most  reasonable  to  argue  that  inflationary 
pressures  in  the  UK  are generated both  by  monetary  phenomena 
which  affect  the  level  of  demand  in  the  economy  and  by  the  in-
fluence  of  large  institutions  in  wage  and  price setting markets. 
In  this  case  the  moderation  in  wage  and  price  inflation from 
mid-1981  onwards  (see  Table  11.1)  will  have  been  partly due  to 
monetary  and  fiscal policy  which  has  clearly been  on  the  firm 
side, but  perhaps  not  as tight  as  the authorities  intended,  and 
partly due  to the moderation  of  monopoly  power.  Under  this  hypo-
thesis it is not  possible to argue  conclusively that  inflationary 
pressures  will  remain  subdued  once  a  recovery  begins  although 
tight monetary  and  fiscal  policies should  help to keep  these 
forces  under  control. -18-
Trends  in  the external accounts 
It  is often  argued  that  one  manifestation of  the  compe-
titive weakness  of  the  UK  economy  has  been  the  tendency  for  the 
current  account  of  the balance of  payments  to deteriorate as  soon 
as  the  rate of  growth gains momentum.  This  itself is often 
seen  as  being  due  to  an  unsatisfactory development  of demand  at 
times  of  rising activity,  with  the growth  of private consumption 
the dominant  expansionary  force,  leading  to the diversion of  ex-
ports to the  home  market,  and  to the excessiVe  growth  of  imports. 
An  examination  of  the data  however  suggests  that  the  UK's 
external  weakness  is more  than  just  a  cyclical problem,  and  that 
there  has  been  a  steady  long  term  deterioration  in  the external 
position.  Thus  Tables  II.7(i):and II.7(ii)  show  clearly that  the 
performance  of  UK  manufactured  exports,  up  to the  mid-nineteen 
seventies,  was  unsatisfactory  with  the  UK's  share of  world  manu-
factured  exports  falling  by  almost  50%  between  1960  and  1977. 
Over  the  same  period the annual  average  volume  growth  of  the  UK's 
manufactured  exports,  at  4,9 %,  although  somewhat  greater than 
that  of  GOP,  was  significantly below  the  figures  for  the  F.R.  of 
Germany  (8,3 %)  or  the  EC  as  a  whole  .<8,1  %),  where  exports  have 
been  rising  in  line with  the growth  of  world  trade  in  manufactu-
res. 
On  the  import  side Table  II.8(i)  shows  the extent  to  which 
import  penetration  in  the  UK  market  for  manufactured  goods  has  in-
creased  in  the  period  since  1970,  particularly in  engineering goods, 
vehicles,  and  clothing  and  footwear.  Although  greater  import  pe-
netration  can  be  a  reflection of  vigorous  world  trade growth  and 
greater trade specialisation  (something  which  most  Governments 
in  the  Western  world  have  been  eager to promote  in  the post-war 
period),  it  is  helpful  for  such  penetration to  be  accompanied  by 
an  adequate  rate of  export  volume  growth,  to avoid generating 
external  pressures.  Table  II.8(ii)  shows  however,  that  as  far 
•. -19-
as  manufactured  goods  are  concerned,  the  volume  of  UK  imports  have 
grown  much  faster  than  exports  whereas  in  the  F.R.  of  Germany  the 
growth  rates  were  much  closer  (6).  This  inadequate performance 
in  manufactures  clearly contributed to the  marked  deficits on  vi-
sible trade  recorded  by  the  UK  to the mid-1970's  which  were,  how-
ever, offset  to a  significant degree  by  surplusses  on  the  invi-
sibles  side  (see  Table  J~.9)_,  wher~JIJe_JJK=-=Performance is  impressive. 
The  performance  of the  UK  economy  on  the external  side 
has  changed  considerably  from  the mid-nineteen  seventies onwards, 
largely due  to the effects of  the  following  three factors  : 
- the accesssion of the  UK  to the  European  Community  at  the be-
ginning  of  1973; 
- the build-up of  North  Sea  oil production  and  the  emergence  of 
the  UK  as  a  significant oil producer; 
a  change  in  the  approach  to macro-economic  management  and  in 
particular the  firm  monetary  and  fiscal  policies pursued  from 
mid-1976  onwards. 
UK  accession  to the  European  Community,  together  with  the 
increased production of  crude oil, much  of  which  is exported to 
other  Community  countries,  has  had  a  significant  impact on  the 
UK's  pattern of  external trade both  for  imports  and  exports. 
Table  !!.10 shows  that, towards  the  latter part  of  the  seventies, 
the proportion of  UK  exports  to the  Community,  and  imports  from 
the  Community,  increased significantly as  a  proportion of total 
exports  and  imports. Indeed  by  1980,  trade developments  with  the 
Community  had  become  so  favourable  as  to yield a  modest  surplus 
on  the balance of trade Con  a  fob/fob  basis)  following  the  sub-
stantial deficits  since the  nineteen sixties. 
(6)  A recent  detailed study  of  the behaviour  of  the volume  of  UK 
manufactured  imports  confirms  the existence of  a  substantial 
trend  rise which  appears  to be  largely unaffected  by  cyclical 
changes  in  demand  (Hibberd  and  Wren-Lewis,  1978>. -20-
Sterling  sirengthened significantly  between  end 
1976  and  early  1981,  contributing to the  very  marked  loss 
in  export  price  competitiveness observed  over  the  same  period, 
but  also to the  sustained. improvement  in  the  UK's  terms  of trade 
(see  Table  II.11).  This  movement  has  been  partly  due  to 
the  emergence  of the  UK  as  an  oil producer.  In  addition  the 
shift of  emphasis  in  macro-economic  policy towards  firm  monetary 
and  fiscal policies,  with  announced  target  ranges  for 
the growth  of  the  money  supply  as  broadly defined,  and  limits to 
the  Public  Sector  Borrowing  Requirement,  had  a  favourable  effect 
on  sentiment  in financial  markets,  and  will  have  added  momentum 
to  the  strengthening of sterling.  This  marked  sterling apprecia-
tion  followed  a  five year period of  sterling decline,  lasting to 
mid-1976,  which,  given  the  time  lags  involved,  benefited the  vo-
lume  growth  of  manufactured  exports  in  later years.  Consequent~ 
ly,  towards  the  end  of  the  1970's the  UK's  increasing  exports 
and  falling  imports  of  crude oil, together  with  the  value of  ma-
nufactured exports  benefiting  from  earlier falls  in sterling, 
amplified  by  improvements  in  the  terms  of  trade, finally  helped 
to  move  the  balance of  trade  into surplus  (7).  In  particular 
the  UK  was  able  to maintain  its market  share  in manufactured  ex-
ports  from  1975  onwards  (in  value  terms>  and  even  to  record  mar-
ginal  improvements.  These  trends  in  the  UK 1s  export  market  share 
to  1979  and  1980  are observable  at  both  the  aggregate  and  the 
detailed  level,  with  the  share of  markets  for  particular manu-
factured  goods  advancing  significantly  (see  Table  II.12>.  How-
ever  the  accumulated  loss of  export  price competitiveness is now 
(7)  It  should  be  stressed that  the  recent  movements  in  import 
volumes  have  also been  favourable  to the  balance of pay-
ments;  in particular,  in  response  to the  move  into  recession 
in  1980,  import  volumes  fell  very  sharply  indeed  (see  Table 
II.9)  and  are  foreseen  to  continue  to do  so  in  1981. -21-
being  reflected  in the movements  of  export  volumes  with  a  very 
sharp  fall  indeed  occurring  through  1980  (see Table  II.7  (i) 
and  ( i i))  ( 8). 
The  contribution of North  Sea  oil to the balance  of 
payments  remains  large  :  the  UK's  net  balance  of  crude oil trade 
is expected  to  be  in  surplus  in  1981  (see Table  II.13>.  However, 
when  account  is taken  of all balance of payments  items  related 
to  crude oil production,  on  both  current  and  capital  accounts, 
a  modest  deficit  remains,  although  there  should be  a  move  into 
surplus  in  the mid-nineteen eighties. 
Table  II.14 summarises  developments  in the UK's  overall 
balance  of  payments  position  since 1970.  The  table  shows  in 
particular the substantial  increase  in  private capital outflows 
towards  the end  of the period,  which  are  a  reflection of the 
gradual  relaxation and  then  removal  of  exchange  controls  in 
1979,  At  the  same  time,  there  has  been  a  marked  build-up of 
external  liabilities in.sterling,  in particular of official 
sterling holdings. 
The  official  reserves  increased dramatically  in  1977 
(aperiodof strong  sterling  recovery  resisted to some  extent  by 
the authorities>,  fell  slightly in 1978,  and  showed  more  moderate 
changes  thereafter. The  level of gross  reserves  now  stands at 
UKL  24  billion,  about  12  %of  GDP  or 50%  of  the annual  imports 
bill. 
(8)  The  fragmentary  information available for  1981,  suggests 
that  UK  market  shares  have  begun  to fall  once  again. T
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Table  II.3  Changes  in ·components  of  demand  and  output,  1977-1980 
Change  in  income  from  employment  at  current  prices 
Change  in  consumer  prices  index  (1975  =  100) 
Volume  changes 
Real  personal  disposable  income 
Private  consumption 
Fixed  investment 
Exports  (goods  & services) 
Imports  (goods  &  services) 
Average  annual  rates 
of  change· (%) 
1977  - 1980 
16,3 
12,1 
5,5 
3,8 
0 
1,5 
3,7 
Gross  domestic  product  at  market  prices  (1975  = 100)  1,1 
Manufacturing  production  -3,2 
Levels 
1977  1980 
Effective  exchange  rate  (1975  = 100)  81,2  96,1 
Oil  output  (million tonnes)  38,3  80,5 
Employment  in manufacturing  industry(million)  7,3  6,8 
Source  Economic  Trends,  HMSO T
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III. THE  MEDIUM  TERM  OUTLOOK 
An  assessment  of the medium  term  prospects  for  the  UK 
economy  must  draw  upon  the three major  points made  in  Cha~ter 
II. Thus 
- On  the output  side the  emergence  of the  UK  as  a  producer  of 
crude oil, and  the appreciation of  sterling,  together  with 
the marked  move  into  recession  in  1980  and  1981,  has  led to 
a  significant  change  in the  UK's  structure of production, 
with  manufacturing  output  and  employment  falling  sharply. 
At  the  same  time  there  has  been  a  rise  in  consumption  but  a 
sharp  decline  in  investment. 
- Although  since mid-1980  inflationary pressures  have  eased 
it is too  early to ascertain whether  there will  be  a  further 
substantial  reduction  in the rate of  wage  and  price 
inflation,  especially as the sterling exchange  rate  is 
unlitely to be  as  strong as  in  1980. 
Crude  oil production,  an  improvement  in the terms  of trade, 
destocking  and  vigorous  volume  growth  of manufactured  exports 
(due  to earlier sterling depreciation), all benefited the 
balance of payments  to 1980.  However  the  loss  of  UK  export 
price competitiveness  from  1975  onwards  has  been  substantial 
and  the period of  heavy  destocking  now  appears  to be  ending 
and  these developments  suggest  that  the UK's  external  position 
may  weaken  somewhat  in  the period ahead. 
A number  of  independant  bodies  produce  medium  term 
forecasts  for  the  UK  economy  most  of  which  assume  that  the 
present  economic  policy  stance will  be  broadly maintained.  A 
number  of these  forecasts  are summarised  in Tables  III.1  to 
III.4. These  forecasts  show  a  wide  range  of possible outcomes. -~-
Nevertheless  the  following  tentative conclusions  can  be 
drawn  from  these  unofficial  projections. 
With  regard to output  : 
- although  in 1981  GDP  is expected to fall  very  sharply there  is 
no  general  consensus  for  a  recovery  in 1982;  indeed  some 
forecasters  foresee  a  further  fall  in output; 
- the majority view  is that  a  recovery  is to be  expected  in 1983 
or 1984  although  output  growth  is  foreseen  to slow  down  again 
in  1985~ 
With  regard to inflation : 
- the general  consensus  is that,  in the  longer  term,  the 
Government's  policies will  be  successful  in  reducing  inflation 
so  that  over  the period to 1985  the annual  increase  in  consumer 
prices  should  have  fallen to below  10  %. 
With  regard to the balance of payments  : 
- estimates of the  likely trends  in the current  account  differ 
widely.  On  balance,  however,  a  substantial deterioration 
is suggested. 
With  regard to unemployment 
- the  forecasts  of unemployment  (excluding  school  leavers)  show 
a  wide  difference  in  views  ranging  from  a  predicted  level of 
2,7  million to 4,3 million at  the end  of 1985. 
As  noted  these  forecasts are based  upon  the assumption 
that  the broad  thrust  of the  UK  Government's  present  monetary  and 
fiscal  policies will  be  maintained.  These  policies have  been 
established within the  framework  of the Medium-Term  Financial 
Strategy  (MTFS)  (Financial .Statement  and  Budget  Report  1980-81, 
March  1981)  which  gives expression to the  view  that  : 
-growth  and  employment  prospects  in the  UK  will only  improve  if 
there  is a  permanent  reduction  in the rate of  inflation and 
if the growth  of the public  sector  is restrained; -41-
- the  key  to achieving  lower  rates of  inflation is the gradual 
reduction  in the ·growth  of the money  supply  as broadly  defined 
(sterling  M3); 
-a reduction  in the public  sector borrowing  requirement  CPSBR) 
makes  the most  important  contribution towards  reducing  the 
growth  of the money  supply. 
Consequently  the  MTFS  sets down  target growth  ranges 
for  the money  supply  falling  from  6-10%  for  the  financial 
year  1981-82  to 4-8  % for  the  financial  year  1983-8~
9 ~ Associated 
projections  for  a  reduction  in the PSBR,  as  a  percentage of 
GOP,  are also given,  and  th~se in turn are based  upon  forecasts 
of general  government  expenditure  and  receipts.  Details of these 
targets and  the  recent  development  of  the target  variables  are set 
out  in Table  III.S and  Graph  III.1 
The  published  MTFS  is not  accompanied  by  a  detailed 
medium  term  forecast  for  the  UK  economy,  but  an  indication is 
given  of official thinking  with  regard to output  growth.  In 
particular the  MTFS  is based  upon  the assumption  that GDP.growth, 
in the three years to 1983,  will  average  1/2 % per  annum,  which 
implies growth  rates of 1 3/4 % in both  1982  and  1983,  following 
an  official  forecast  of a  fall  in output  of 2%  in 1981.  This 
figure  representes a  modest  downward  revision to the previous as-
sumption  of  1%  for average  GOP  growth  to 1983,published  in  an  earlier 
version of the  MTFSCFinancial  Statement  and  Budget  Report  1979-80, 
March  1980). 
The  medium  term  outlook  for  the  UK  appears  to be  less 
satisfactory than  for  other  member  countries of  the European 
Community,  particularly with  regard to growth  (see Table  III.1>. 
The  following  sections of this paper  will  attempt  to establish why 
the  UK 1s  performance  is  likely to be  relatively weak. 
(9)  Strictly speaking  there is a  target  for  sterling  M3  in the 
year  ahead  only;  other  MTFS  figures are considered as 
illustrative ranges. T
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Table  III.3  A comparison  of medium  term  forecasts  for  the current  account 
of  the balance of payments,  1981-1985 
1981 
Forecasting  body  : 
National  Institute of  Economic 
and  Social  Research  2,1 
Cambridge  Economic  Policy 
Group 
The  St.  James  Group 
London  Business  School 
ITEM  Club 
Oxford  Economic  Forecasting 
Limited 
Phillips and  Drew 
1,7 
4,1 
5,2 
5,5 
5,7 
1982 
1,8 
0,6 
-0,2 
1,6 
-6,9 
0,9 
{a)  Average  current  account  deficit  1980-1985. 
Sources  :  See  Table  III.1 
UKL  billion 
1983  1984 
3,7  2,2 
-0,2 
1,5  2,8 
-7,4  -8,0 
-0,2  -1,5 
-0,6  <a> 
1985 
0,6 
-9,0 
4,0 
-5,4 
-1,7 
Table  III.4  A comparison  of  the medium  term  forecast  for  unemployment  1985  (a) 
Forecasting  body  : 
National  Institute of  Economic  and  Social  Research 
Cambridge  Economic  Policy Group 
The  St.  James  Group 
London  Business  School 
ITEM  Club 
Oxford  Economic  Forecasting  Limited 
Liverpool  Group 
millions 
3,7 
4,3 
2,75  {b) 
2,7 
3,6 
2,7 
2,75  <c> 
{a)  UK  wholly  unemployed  excluding  school  leavers,  unless otherwise  stated. 
{b)  First  half 1984. 
<c>  1982 -45-
Table  lii.5  Monetary· targets,  sterling  M3  growth  and  the public sector borrowing 
requirement- (PSBR)  1972/73- 1983/84 
Target  growth  Actual  growth  Target  PSBR  as 
Financial  years  rate for  ster- rate of ster- in  MFTS (e)  as 
ling  M3  ling  M3  a  % of GOP  (b) 
(%)  (%) 
1972  - 1973  25,2 
1973  - 1974  23,5 
1974  - 1975  8,5 
1975  - 1976  6,9 
1976  - 1977  9  - 13  (c)  7,6  (c) 
1977  - 1978  9  - 13  15,5 
1978  - 1979  8 - 12  11,4 
1979  - 1980  7 - 11  (d)  12,5  4,75 
1980  - 1981  7 - 11  18,4  3,75 
1981  - 1982  6 - 10  (a)  4,25  (a) 
1982  - 1983  5 - 9  (a)  3,25  (a) 
1983  - 1984  4 - 8  (a)  2,0  (a) 
(a)  Budget,  10  March  1981,  Medium-Term  Financial  Strategy. 
(b)  In  constant price terms. 
(c)  M3 
(d)  From  June  1979 
(e)  DG  II forecasts 
Actual  PSBR 
as  a  %  of  GOP 
3,8 
6,0 
9,1 
9,6 
6,6 
3,7 
5,5 
4,9 
5,7 
(4,4)  (e) 
Sources~=  HMSO,  financial  Statement  and  Budget  Re~ort; 1981-82,  Bank  of  England 
Quarterly Bulletin;  Commission  staff. -46-
Graph  111.1  UK  public  expenditure  and  public  sector borrowing  requirement 
1975/76 - 1983/84 
75/76  76/77  77/78  78/79  79/80  80/81  81/82  82/83 
(a)  Medium-term  financial  strategy 
83/84 
Sources  :  HMSO,  Financial  Statement  and  Budget  Report,  1981-82  '~he Government 
Expenditure  Plans  1981-82-1983-84  (Cmnd  8195). (7} 
-47-
IV.  MAIN  MEDIUM-TERM  ECONOMIC  ISSUES 
Investment  and  productivity 
~Q~~~t~~Qt_~u~tt 
One  of the  most  often quoted  reasons  for  the  UK's  weak 
growth  performance  is the  relatively  low  proportion of  GOP  which 
is devoted  to  investment  expenditure  and  its consequences  for 
productivity growth.  As  Table  IV.1  shows,  over  the years  invest-
ment  has  formed  a  smaller part of  GOP  in the  UK  than  in most 
other  industrialised countries.  However  it is  much  more  diffi-
cult  to  judge to  what  extent  this  has  accounted  for  the  lower 
growth  rate,  is itself the  result  of  the  lower  growth  rate, or 
represents  socio-economic  factors peculiar to the  UK. 
In  terms  of  aggregate  investment  the  evidence  is  clear 
between  1973  and  1980  an  average  18,8 % of  GOP  was  devoted  to 
investment  expenditures  compared  with  21,4 % in  the  Community 
as  a  whole,  maintaining  the  relative positions evident  since the 
mid-fifties.  An  examination  of  Table  IV.2,  which  gives  a  secto-
ral  breakdown  of gross  fixed _capital  formation  in  terms  of  GDP, 
shows  however  that the  UK's  performance  is not  equally  weak  in 
all areas of  economic  activity.  In  particular over  the years to 
1978  investment  in  the  UK's  manufacturing  sector  has  been  main-
tained at  around  3,5%  <10>of  GOP  while  in  the  Community  <11> 
(12)  as  a  whole  a  decline  in this share to around  the  same  level 
(10)Some  fall off  in  investment  by  manufacturing  companies  (due 
mainly  to cyclical  factors>  was  evident  in the  UK  in  1980. 
Data  on  the  comparative  position  in the  Community  as  a  whole 
is not  yet  readily available. 
(1 1)Excluding  DK,  GR,  IRL  and  L 
(12>  These  comparisons  ignore  the effect of  increased  leasing of 
capital goods  from  the  service sector. -48-
has  been  evident  since the first oil shock.  The  effect of  in-
vestment  related to the exploitation of  North  Sea  oil  is  shown 
by  the  larger share of  UK  GOP  devoted  to the  energy  and  mining 
sector  in  recent  years.  Aggregating these two  sectors  shows  that 
the  UKhas  committed  a  larger share of  GOP  to  industrial  invest-
ment  than  is the  case  in either the  Community  or  in the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany.  It  is  in  the service and  general  govern-
ment  sectors that,  in proportional  terms,  the  UK  has  invested 
fewer  resources. 
Splitting total capital expenditure  into equipment  and 
construction expenditures  reveals that, prior to  1973,  the  UK 
invested as great  a  share of  GOP  in  equipment  as  in  the  Communi-
ty as  a  whole,  and  has  since  then, partly because  of  North  Sea 
oil, invested at  much  the  same  rate as  the  F-ederal  Republic  of 
Germany  (approximately 9 %),  somewhat  above  the  Community  rate. 
Expenditure  on  building  in  terms  of  GOP  is markedly  less  in  the 
UK  than  in  the  rest  of  Europe,  running  some  four  percentage 
points  below  the  average  figure,  while  within  this  category the 
UK  devotes  only  approximately  3,5 % of  GOP  to  housing  compared 
to about  5,5 % in  the  Community. 
This  brief consideration of  the sectoral  breakdown  of 
UK  investment  suggests that  it is too  simplistic to attribute 
the  UK 1s  poorer  industrial performance  to the overall  share of 
investment  in  GOP. 
The  lower  growth  rates  experienced  in  the  UK  (see  Chap-
ter  II)  have  meant  that, although  in some  sectors the  commit-
ment  of  resources  in  terms  of  GOP  has  matched  that  in  faster 
growing  economies,  the absolute  increment  to the  capital  stock 
has  been  significantly smaller.  If  replacement  rates  have  been 
no  greater  in  the  UK  (13)  then  this means  that  a  smaller portion 
(13)  This  certainly seems  to  have  been  the  case. -~-
of  the overall  capital  stock  will  embody  the  latest technolo-
gy  with  attendant  consequenses  on  the  level  of productivity of 
the  economy  and,  over  time,  on  its sustainable  rate of growth. 
This  reasoning  suggests that  a  sustained  increase  in the  rate 
of growth  of  investment  expenditures  is  required to  improve 
the overall  performance  of  the  UK  economy  rather than  just  a 
step  increase  in  the share of national  resources  devoted  to  in-
vestment. 
E~!~!m1~!~!~-~!_jD~~!!~~D! 
Although  the  subject  of  considerable  research efforts, 
there  is no  universally accepted model  of  the determinants of 
private  investment  expenditure.  There  is  however,  a  wide  area 
of  agreement  over  the  variables that  are  likely to  influence  in-
vestment  if not  on  the size of their effects.  Expenditure  on 
capital goods  is crucially dependent  on  their prospective yields: 
a  number  of  inter-related factors  will  enter the  ex-ante  judgment 
of  a project's viability.  These  include  : 
- the  current  rate of profit on  similar projects 
the availibility of  finance  and  the  (opportunity)  cost  of  capi-
tal set  by  the  future  (uncertain>  rates of  return  in other 
forms  of  investment 
- the  likely future  conditions of demand  and  their  influence on 
the projects profitability. 
An  assessment  of  the  UK's  investment  performance 
must  therefore examine  the  evolution of these  factors  and  con-
trast their behaviour  with  the  experience  elsewhere. -50-
As  Table  IV.3  show~.on a  pre-tax basis the  real  rate of 
return  (14)  on ·capital employed  <excluding  North  Sea  oil activi-
ties>  has  fluctuated  around  a  declining  trend  from  nearly  11  X in 
the mid-1960's  to only  3 X in  1980,  with  large step falls evident 
in  1974  and  1980,  while  data  for  the first  quarter of  1981  show 
a  further  fall to around  2 X.  On  a  post-tax basis  (Bank  of  Eng-
land  Quarterly Bulletin, June  1981>  the  real  rate of  return  lay 
between  5,5 X and  8 % with  the exceptions  of  1975  and  1980  when 
it was  between  3 % and  4 %.  For  manufacturing  industry alone  the 
pre-tax  rate of  return  has  shown  very  similar movements  to that 
for  the aggregate measure  but  has  been  consistently about  one  per-
centage  point  below  the  aggregate  level.  Moreover  as  Graph  IV.1 
shows  there seems  to be  a  strong  correlation between  the  rate of 
investment  and  the  average  rate of profitability in the previous 
year. 
Although  exact  comparisons  of  the  level of profitability 
across  economies  are difficult. Table  IV.4  indicates that, since 
the  1960's at  least, the  UK  has  experienced a  significantly weaker 
profit performance  than  other major  industrialised nations  and 
that  in  manufacturing  its relative performance  has  declined mar-
kedly  over  the  seventies, notwithstanding  the general decline  in 
profitability that  seems  to  have  occured  since the  late 1960's. 
A number  of factors  have  been  advanced  as playing  a  role 
in this  secular decline.  For  example  Manison  (Manison,  1978)  has 
pointed out  that  the  sharp  fall  in manufacturing  profits since 
1973  has  been  partly due  to the brunt  of the  adj~stment to  th~ 
(14)  These  are  average  measures  and  cannot  be  taken to  indicate 
exactly the  <marginal)  rate of  return on  new  investment. 
Furthermore  the  accuracy  of these  calculated average  rates 
depends  partly on  the estimate of the  value of the capital 
stock.  If this  value  is overestimated due  to insufficient 
allowance  being  made  -for  economic  obsolescence  then  the 
calculated  rate of  return  will  be  underestimated. -51-
first oil shock  being  borne  by  profits and  not  shared  by  real 
wages  (15.)  while  he  ar.gues  that  over  the  longer  term  low  rates 
of  labour  productivity growth,  below  the  rate of  real  wage 
.growth  in non-manufacturing,  and  an  underlying 
decline  in  the marginal  physical  productivity of  capital 
have  also  reduced  the  rate of return.  Moreover  the poor 
profits performance  has  reduced  the  capacity of  companies  to 
undertake  new  investment. 
While  the falling  level of profitability has  reduced  the 
incentive to  invest  per se  the  real  cost  of  capital appears  to 
have  moved  in  a  way  which  partially offsets this decline.  The 
relationship between  the marginal  profitability of  capital and 
its marginal  cost  is proxied  by  the  valuation  ratio  ( 1q1).  This 
is  calculated as  the average  post-tax  real  rate of  return on 
existing assets to the post-tax  real  cost  of  capital and  has 
exhibited a  less  strongly declining  trend than  the  real  rate of 
return.  Nonetheless,  as  Graph  IV.2  shows,  it has  been  since the 
first oil shock  below  unity,  at.which  level  the  costs andre-
turns are equal,  and  is presently very  close to its historically 
low  level. 
It  has  often been  argued  that  the availability of exter-
nal  finance  has  acted as  a  constraint  on  the ability of  firms  to 
invest;  however  the Wilson  Committee  (HMSO,  June  1980>,  which 
reviewed  the functioning  of British financial  institutions, found 
that this  was  generally not  the  case, but  with  the notable excep-
tion  of  small  firms,  who  can,  in  certain  circumstances, face sig-
nificant difficulties. 
(15.>  This  movement  seems  to  have  been  more  pronounced  in  the  UK 
than  in  the  Community  as  a  whole  after the first oil shock 
while  the  UK  experience after the  second  oil shock  has  been 
much  nearer the  average  (European  Economy,  No.  10,  December 
1981,  Ch.  4). -52-
There  is  strong  econometric  evidence  (16)  to  show  that 
the  level  and  rate of  change  of demand  has  a  pervasive effect on 
the  level  of  investment.  To  a  large extent this is because  pro-
fitability  is dependent  on  the  level  and  rate of growth  of de-
mand.  Depressed  de~and conditions or  a  belief that  any  growth 
spurt  will  be  short  lived will  undoubtedly  have  reduced  the  in-
centive to  invest.  This  seems  to  have  been  the  case  in the  UK 
over  a  long  period of  time  where  the  stop-go  cycles  have  now 
given  way  to a  stagnation or decline  in output.  Moreover  the 
loss of  competitiveness  caused  by  the appreciation of the exchange 
rate  in  conjunction  with  an  inflationary  wage  round  in  1979-1980 
have  put  further  pressures  on  company  profitability. 
£~ei!~!-~!~E~-~~~-e~!~~!i~!-~~!E~! 
The  stagnation of  investment  expenditures  since the first 
oil shock,  will  tend to  have  further  increased the  average  age 
of  the  capital  stock  and  reduced  the  rate at  which  technical  in-
novations  are  embodied  in  the production process.  Overlain on 
this process  is the  economic  obsolesence of the existing capital 
stock  induced  by  the  step  changes  in  the  relative price of  energy. 
Both  these  influences  will  have  had  detrimental  effects on  the 
Levell and  growth  of potential output  in  the  UK. 
Moreover,  Manison  (Manison,  1978)  points out  that  even 
from  the  mid-60's  there was  a  tendancy  for  the  rate of  invest-
ment  in  heavy  manufacturing,with  the notable  exception of  che-
micals,  to be  below  the  average  for  manufacturing  as  a  whole. 
Pratten  (Pratten, )971>  and  others  (Maizels,  1963)  have  argued 
that  it is  in  these  industries that  high  output  returns  on  new 
capital  are most  easily generated. Moreover  a  failure to invest 
in  the technologically dynamic  industries  has  tended  to  lead to an 
(16)  An  example  of this type of  work  is to be  found  in Bean, 
1979. -53-
inability to  supply  a  range  (17>  of  finished  manufactured  goods 
in  time  of  boom. 
No  recent  estimates  have  been  made  of the potential out-
put  of  the  UK  economy;  however  as  Table  IV.S  shows  the gross  ca-
pital stock  in  the  UK  has  been  showing  a  declining  rate of growth 
since  1973  before  any  account  is taken of the economic  obsolesence 
of parts of the  stock  due  to the  energy  price  rises.  For  both 
these reasons typical  techniques  for  assessing  the full  capacity 
output  of  the  economy,  such  as  peak  to peak  trend,  are  likely 
to be even more uncertain than usual.  As  pointed out  by  Robinson 
(Robinson,  1981)  manufacturing  output  is  currently only  6  r.  be-
low  trend  if a  five  year  moving  average  is  used  compared  with  22% 
below if a linear trend for  the period  1963-79  is fitted.  Although 
this result  does  not  translate easily to total output,  since the 
other sectors of the economy  tend to use  energy  less  intensively 
than  manufacturing,  there  is a  clear message  that the  spare  capa-
city  in  the  UK  economy  is probably  much  below  the  level  suggested 
by  the traditional  indicators. 
[~~~tt~~-t~q_q~~~~~m~~t 
Expenditures  on  research  and  development  have  very  un-
certain  returns  but  in  cases  where  a  successful  innovation  re-
sults the  returns  may  be  very  high  indeed.  Graph  IV.3  shows 
that  the  UK  commits a  similar proportion of  GOP  to  R & 0 as  other 
industrialised nations,  albeit  with  a  lower  absolute  level  of 
expenditure.  Moreover  the public  authorities  fund  a  larger share 
of  R & 0  in  the  UK,  32  r.  of  the total  in  1978  CUK  Business  Moni-
tor,  1981).  The  strength of this public  involvement  in  R &  0 is 
shown  by  Table  IV.6  where~in terms  of  GOP  the  UK's  expenditure 
exceeds  that of  any  other  Community  country.  However  the  compo-
(17)  Manison  cites the  shortages of  steel,  castings, electric 
motors,  machine  tools  and  diesel  engines  in  1973. -54-
sition of this public  expenditure differs greatly from  the 
average  with  relatively small  amounts  being  spent  on  energy, 
( 
industry  and  general  knowledge  compensated  by  large defence 
expenditures  which  account  for  over  50  X of  the total budget 
compared  with  12%  in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and  a 
Community  average  of  22  %. 
This  predominance  of  defence  expenditures  by  the public 
sector  is also  demonstrated  in  Table  IV.~ which  shows  a  heavy 
concentration of  industrial  R & D expenditure on  aerospace  and 
electronics;  however,the  NEDO  (NEDO,  1981)  reports  that  the  in-
dustrial  spin-off  from  these activities  is  less than  for  compa-
rable activities  in other  countries.  In  addition,  in  the  areas, 
such  as  electrical machinery  and  chemicals,  where  the  UK  effort 
is  relatively  weak,  there  is  little evidence  that  significant 
imports. of  new  technology  are being  made.  In  sum  this  suggests 
that  the  technological  foundation  from  which  an  improvement  in  the 
UK's  investment  performance  can  be  made  is not  being  laid either 
by  domestic  efforts or  through  the  purchases of technology  from 
abroad,although  it must  be  noted  that  capital  goods  imports  have 
grown  quickly  in  recent  years. 
Growth  in total  productivity, the  amount  of output 
which  can  be  produced  with  a  given  Level  of  factor  inputs,  varies 
across  economies,  between  sectors and  over  time.  As  shown  in 
Chapter  II  the  UK  has  experienced  Low  productivity growth 
throughout  the  Last  two  decades.  The  more  detailed  comparison 
in  Table  IV.8  further  demonstrates  this point  and  shows  a  growth 
rate of  Labour  productivfty  in the  UK  well  below  the  Community 
average  and  Japan,  though  above  the  rates  experienced  in  the 
USA.  The  more  Limited  data  on  capital  productivity  <Table  IV.9) 
shows  a  more  complicated  picture  where  the  UK's  performance  has 
been  better than that  in  the  Federal  Republic  of Germany  but 
worse  than  the  Community  average. (8) 
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A second  striking feature of  the table  is the dramatic 
slowing  of  Labour  productivity growth  since  the first oil shock, 
which  has  reduced  the  trend  rate of  Labour  productivity growth 
in all  countries  by  one  to three percentage points,  with  the 
exception of  Japan,  where  the  rate  has  fallen  even  more  markedly. 
Why  the  UK  should  suffer a  Lower  rate of  Labour  produc-
tivity growth  than  its international  competitors  is a  problem  to 
which  a  large number  of  commentators  have  addressed themselves. 
The  preceding  discussion  in this section suggests that  although 
the  rate of  investment  in  terms  of  GOP  in  the  UK,  especially  in 
equipment,  has  not  been  much  below  that  in faster growing  compe-
titors, the direction of this  investment  and  its content  of tech-
nical  innovation  has  tended  to generate  smaller  increases  in out-
put,  resulting  in  turn  in  smaller gains  in both  labour  and  capi-
tal productivity than  elsewhere. 
In  a  wide  ranging  study, Caves  (Caves,  1980)  puts  forward 
several  reasons  for  the  Low  productivity growth  in  much  of  UK  ma-
nufacturing  industry.  These  include  Long  standing attitudes of 
the  work  force  against  change  and  cooperation,  poor  administrative 
capabilities of  management  which  is particularly evident  in  large 
enterprises  and  above  average  diseconomies  of  scale  in  large 
plants. 
The  general  decline  in  Labour  productivity growth  rates 
in  industrial  countries  since 1973  has  often been  ascribed to 
structural shifts following  the  increase  in  the  relative price 
of oil  (European  Economy  No.  9,  July  1981>.  This  view  is coun-
tered both  by  Maddison  (Maddison,  1979>  and  an  OECD  study  COECD, 
July  1979),  which  conclude  that  the  slowdown  is almost  entirely 
attributable to cyclical  factors.  In  particular, the  OECD  study 
notes  that  structural shifts  in  demand  in  the  UK,  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany,  France  and  Japan  have  in  fact  had  a  margi-
nally positive effect on  productivity growth  both pre and  post 
1973. -56-
It  is difficult to assess  ~o what  extent  the differences 
in  demand  conditions  in  the  UK  compared  with  its competitors  have 
resulted  in  the  UK 1s  lower  rate of productivity growth.  It is, 
however,  notable that  the  current  recession  has  been  associated 
with  significant  labour  shedding  and  in  recent  months,  as  output 
has  stabilised, this  has  led to a  sharp  improvement  in  producti-
vity.  It  is too early to judge to what  extent this  improvement 
represents essentially a  step  change,  caused  by  tMe  closure of 
the  least  efficient plants and  firms, or represents a lasting shift 
to a  higher  trend growth  rate of productivity,  as  a  consequence 
of  improved  attitudes. 
~ms!!_!i!!!!§ 
In  r~cent years  the  role of  the  small  enterprise  in  the 
growth  and  development  of the economy  has  been  the  subject  of 
new  interest. 
As  part of  supply  based policies the  small  firm  is  seen 
as  an  area  where  entrepreneurial  dynamism  can  be  re-established. 
There  is  however  little information  on  what  proportion of  new 
small  firms,  for  whom  conditions of external  finance  have  been 
greatly  improved  in  recent  years,  are  capable of  rapid growth  and 
long  life, nor  are there any  well  developed  economic  theories 
which  demonstrate  how  an  improved  macro-economic  performance  will 
automatically flow  from  the proliferation of  small  business,  many 
of  which  will  be  in  the service sector.  It is nonetheless note-
worthy  that  Department  of  Industry  figures  show  that  even  with 
current  economic  difficulties approximately  10  000  new  ventures 
are being  established per month. 
Conclusion 
---------- This  section demonstrates,  in  contrast  to  a  widely  held 
view  especially outside Britain, that  the  UK's  investment  perfor-
mance  is not  uniformly  weaker  than  in other  countries.  Indeed, 
as  far  as  directly productive  investment, particularly in  the -57-
manufacturing  sector,  is concerned  the  UK  devotes  a  similar 
proportion of  resources  as  elsewhere.  It  is  the addition to 
output  that  this  investment  brings  about  that  seems  to be  lower 
in  the  UK  although  it is difficult to pin  down  exactly  why  this 
should  be  the  case.  Factors that  have  been  advanced  to explain 
this performance  include the  system  of education,  the attitudes 
of  management  and  labour,  the discontinuities  of policy  and 
lack  of  concensus  at  both  the national  and  company  level. -59-
Labour  market  trends and  probl~ms 
E!~2~!2P~j~-~!!~~~ 
Since  about  1974  the population  of  working  age  has  increa-
e 
sed  rapidly.  High  birth rates  in  the 1960's  increased  the  number 
of young  people  entering  the workforce.  At  the  same  time  the 
death  rate of those of  working  age  fell  as  did net  emigration • 
.  These  demographic  trends  will  continue  to  have  a  major  impact  on 
the  labour  market  over  the next  five  years.  They  will  be 
reinforced  by  a  sharp  decrease  in  the number  of  men  and  women 
reaching  normal  retirement  age,  65  and  60  years  respectively. 
Not  until the middle  of the decade  will  there be  a  temporary  in-
crease  in  the  number  of people  reaching  the  age  of  65  ~8).  Table 
IV.10Ci>  shows  the  change  in  the size of  the population of  working 
age  for the period  1977/81  and  the  estimated  change  in the period 
1981/86,  at  732  000  and  762  000  respectively,  a  rate of  increase 
of  about  1/2 % per  annum.  The  increases  are  concentrated  among 
men  and  unmarried  women  and  among  younger  people,  that  is, those 
groups  for  which  activity  rates  are the  highest. 
~£,!j_yj_!_y_.r.iil~.§ 
Between  1971  and  1977  overall activity rates  increased 
from  61,0%  to 62,2%  in spite of  a  decline  in  the  rate  for  older 
males  associated principally with  a  trend towards  earlier retire-
ment.  This  development,  allied to the growth  in  the  number  of 
people of  working  age,  tended  to exacerbate  unemployment  levels 
and  was  mainly  due  to a  steady  increase  in  the  female  activity  rate 
up  to 1977.  The  increase  was  particularly big  for  married  women 
(see Table  IV.11>.  The  introduction of equal  pay,  the  increasing 
(18)  These  trends  reflect  lower  birth rates  during  the years of the 
First.world War,  the post-war  baby  boom  and  the  low  level of 
births  which  persisted after 1920  for  the  remainder  of  the 
inter-war period. -W-
acceptability of  married  women  working,  the growth  of  service 
industries  and  of part-time  work  opportunities, the decline  in 
real  average  earning  between  1976  and  1977  and  the  resultant de-
sire to supplement  family  income  were  all factors  which  may  have 
contributed to the  increase  in  female  activity rates.  It should 
be  noted  that  female  activity  rates  in  the  UK  are  high  relative 
to other  countries of  the  Community;  in particular rates  for 
women  in  the  40-60  age  brackets  are  20  percentage points  higher 
than  the  EC  average  (Table  IV.12>. 
In  the period  1977/81  a  significant ·change  occurred. 
The  decline  in  the overall  male  activity  rate accelerated sharply, 
and,  in  contrast  to most  other  Community  countries,  the overall 
female  activity  rate  ceased  to  rise and  even  edged  downward 
(Table  IV.11).  The  net  result  of  the demographic  trends  and  the 
changes  in activity  rates  was  that  over  the period  1971/77  1,1 
million people  entered the  labour  market  but  in  the  1977/81  period 
there  was  a  reduction  of  140  000  despite a  large  increase  in  the 
population of  working  age  (see  Tables  IV.10Cii>  and  (iii)).  Conse-
quently  the  rise  in  the unemployment  in the  last  few  years  would 
have  been  even  steeper,  had  the activity rates not  fallen. 
In  the  years  to  come,  demographers  (HMSO,  Employment 
Gazette,  April  1981)  assume  that  activity rates, overall,  will 
remain  broadly  unchanged.  On  this basis,  in  the period  1981/86, 
the  labour  force  is expected  to rise  by  685  000,  a  substantial 
turnround  from  the fall  that  occured  in  the preceding 5-year 
period  <Table  IV.10Cii). 
~~~~~!~~~-~~:~~~~~~:~! 
It  is  sometimes  alleged that  the  supply  of  labour  has  been 
increasingly affected  by  the extent  of  voluntary unemployment  and 
the  degree  to  which  people  registered as  unemployed  are  engaged  in 
remunerative  work  in  the  informal  economy.  Generous  levels of  un-
employment  benefit  are often  cited as  a  major  factor  e~couraging 
voluntary  unemployment  COECD,  1981>.  Studies  (eg  Nickell,  1980) -61-
on  the  effects of  unemployment  and  related benefits on  the  level 
of unemployment  .noted  however, that (i) the  evidence  available  up  to 
1979  suggested the effect of higher  unemployment  benefits  was  of minor 
importance in influencing the flow into unemployment;  Cii) the  level 
of benefits affected the duration of periods of unemployment  with the 
ratio between  unemployment  benefits  and  the  expected  wage  having 
less  of  a  weighting  in  unemployed  peoples' decisions after 26 weeks 
unemployment; (iii) long  periods of  unemployment  were  due  to a  com-
Plex of factors such as age, family  ci rcumstan'ces, skills and  location. 
No  precise  information  is available on  the effects of 
the  informal  economy.  Recent  estimates  (Smith,  1981)  of the 
global  impact  of the  informal  economy  - accounting  for  between 
2  and  7  1/2 % of  GDP  with  associated tax  losses of between 
UKL  3  and  UKL  3  1/2 million  a year- suggest  that  some  involve-
ment  of  the  unemployed  is  likely. 
2~~!~.!~~.:!~2 
In  spite of  much  anecdotal  evidence,  it is extremely 
difficult either to define or pinpoint precisely overmanning  in 
British  industry.  The  built-in  incentive for  employers  to  hoard 
labour,  particularly skilled  labour,  because  of  the  high  direct 
and  indirect  costs  associated with  redundancies,  is  well  known; 
bad  management  practices  and  inflexible trade  union  attitudes 
are  also often  cited as  factors  but  at  best  overmanning  is a 
relative  concept  and  its impact  on  the  economy  as  a  whole  is de-
pendent  on  the  level  of  wages. 
The  following  type of  arguments  have  been  used  to  suggest 
that  the  UK  economy  has  a  tendency  to use  labour  inefficiently. 
- The  fall  in  UK  output  below  the  longer  term  growth  trend esta-
blished  in  the  1960's  (15  % by  1979)  was  not  proportionally  re-
flected  in the  movement  in  employment  (see Graph  IV.4, lower part). 
- An  analysis  by  the  Cambridge  Economic  Policy  Group  (Cambridge 
Economic  Policy  Review,  April  1981)  (see  Table  IV.13)  compares -62-
actual  changes  in  employment  with  those predicted as  a  function 
of output;  the  results  shown  on  the  heroic  assumption  that  if 
the  relationship  has  held  over  the projection period then  a 
level  of  recorded  employment  some  2 million  lower  might  have 
been  expected  at  the  end  of  1979. 
- In  the past  government  policies  have  often  been  geared to job 
preservation  (see  Table  IV.14>. 
As  the  section on  productivity  showed,  there  have  been 
sharp gains  in  labour  productivity over  the  course of  the pre-
sent  recession, particularly  in  manufacturing.  To  the extent 
that  this  has  been  due  to  labour  shedding  then  this  may  indicate 
a  change  in  behaviour  away  from  the practices  which  led to over-
manning. 
E~~~E2~2E~2~-~~2~~~ 
Table  IV.15  shows  changes  in  employment  per  sector.  The 
expansion  of  employment  in  the  services  sector  was  a  marked 
feature of occupational  change  up  to 1978,  reflecting  in part 
the  strong growth  in public  sector  employment  in  such  services 
as  education  and  health.  Over  the next  few  years  it is  likely 
that  reductions  in  industrial  employment  will  continue:  enginee-
ring, textiles and  clothing,  transport  and  communications  and 
distribution are particularly vulnerable areas.  In  general, 
there  is  a  long-term occupational  shift  from  manual  to non-man-
ual  jobs;  nearly one  half of all  jobs  can  now  be  classified as 
non-manual,  while  there  remains  a  relatively fast  growth  in  the 
demand  for  highly  skilled  labour  in  both  manual  and  non-manual 
occupations. 
Unemployment  and  its structure 
Total  unemployment  rose  from  1 302  000  in October  1979  to (9) 
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2  744  000  in  July  1981  (19).  Movements  in  annual  average  unem-
ployment  rates  in  recent  years  are  shown  in  Table  IV.16Ci>  and  a 
comparison  with  other  EC  countries  is given  in  Table  IV.16Cii). 
The  situation  in  the  UK  1s  relatively serious, of  the 9  million 
unemployed  in  the  Community  about  one  third are  in  the  United 
Kingdom  which  also accounts  for  about  40  % of  the  unemployed  adult 
males. 
Further  features  in  UK  unemployment  trends  since the end 
of  1979  are  : 
The  worsening  position of  young  people  as shown  in Table  IV.17. 
That  although  job  losses  among  general  labourers  and  persons  in 
other  manual  occupations  accounted  for  over  half the absolute  rise 
in  unemployment  betwe~n end  1979  and  early 19a1,there has  been  a 
marked  rise  in  job  losses  among  craft  workers  (see  Tables  IV.18(i) 
and  Cii)). Apparently,  the  widely  held  view  that  the  risk  of  un-
employment  is  low  for  skilled workers  is not  correct;  some  skills 
are becoming  obsolete for  structural  reasons  and  others  are not 
demanded  as  a  result of  the  recession. 
- The  marked  increase  in  the  duration of  unemployment  for  all age 
groups  (see  Table  IV.19). 
- The  continued  existence of  both  regional  and  geographical  skill 
mismatches  between  the  supply  and  demand  for  Labour. 
<19)  It is possible that  the  unemployment  figures  overstate the 
level of unemployment  because  of precautionary  registration 
by  people  in  the  course  of  changing  jobs and  other factors. 
The  Cambridge  Economic  Policy  Group  (Cambridge  Economic.  Po-
licy  Review,  April  1981)  estimates this distortion at  about 
450  000  but  points out  that  it is necessary to set against 
this figure  the  downward  bias  caused  by  discouraged  workers 
leaving  the  labour  force. -64-
2~1?1?!l'_.!j.9!_!'!!.!~!!~ 
(i)  Work  sharing  and  changes  in  working  time 
It  is  not  clear  whether  deliberate generalised measures  by 
Government  to  reduce  working  hours  per man,  such  as  limiting 
overtime  and  extending  annual  holidays,  could  be  used  success-
fully  as  a  means  of  reducing  unemployment.  Experience  of  such 
schemes  to-date  has  not  been  extensive enough  to  identify what 
the effect of  such  measures  could  be.  There  are  a  number  of 
reasons,  however,  for  believing  that  resultant  job·creation 
would  be  small  and  that  in  certain  circumstances  job  losses 
may  be  provoked  (Day,  1981). 
As  a  means  of  work  sharing,  a  reduction  in  the  average  re-
tirement  age  would  seem  to  have  more  scope  in  the  UK  since the 
activity  rates  for  both  men  and  women  in  the 6D-64  age  brackets 
are  some  20  and  10  percentage points higher,respectively,  than 
those  for  the  Community  as  a  whole.  However  the present  struc-
ture of  pension provision  is such  that  the  cost  to Government 
of  a  comprehensive  early  retirement  scheme  would  be  considerable 
while  private sector  schemes  would  have  great difficulty  in 
accomodating  such  a  change. 
Cii)Regional  mobility measures 
Although  UK  unemployment  rates  have  exhibited quite  wide 
regional  differences,  even  when  viewed  in the  Community  context, 
the migration of  Labour  has  tended  to be  on  a  smaller  scale than 
has  been  the  case,  for  example,  in Italy. 
The  small  scale mobility  incentive  schemes  operated  in the 
UK  over  the  past  decade  do  not  seem  to have  been  a  major  influence 
on  migrants.  A recent  study  (Beaumont,  1979)found  that  the 
employment  transfer  scheme  in  the  UK  had  not  affected the  bulk 
of migrants;  of those  who  were  assi~ted under  the  scheme  many 
would  have  moved  anyway  and  others did  not  stay  Long  in  their 
new  regions.  The  study  also  suggested that  in any  case 
~· -~-
the  social  and  economic·costs  of  Labour  mobility  were  not 
high  in  the  UK. 
Given  the  continued existence of  skill shortages (DE, 
September  1980,  p.  102)  in  the  South  East  and  South  of  Eng-
Land  even  in  recession  there seems  a  prima  facie  case  for 
some  movement  of  skilled ·Labour.  However  the bulk  of  assis-
ted migrants  in  the past  seem  to  have  been  unskilled or  semi-
skilled. 
(iii) Vocational  training 
Government  sponsored  vocational training  in  the  UK  has 
never  been  on  the  scale  encountered  in  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany,  where  it is estimated that  about  3% of the total 
labour  force  participate yearly  in  further training measures 
(Hofbauer,  1981)  and  where  some  60%  of  the  work  force  posses 
intermediate qualifications  compared  with  30%  in  the  UK. 
These  differences  are  reflected  in training methods.  In  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  the  emphasises  is on  formal  trai-
ning  and  examinations  to obtain qualifications  while  in  the 
UK  the prevalent  method  has  been  on-the-job training over  a 
number  of  years.  Rapid  technological  and  economic  change  which 
require  the  speedy  absorbtion of transferable skills now  gives 
the  balance of  advantage  to the  German  system  and  other  Euro-
pean  countries  are  moving  increasingly towards  this vocational 
training  (S.J.  Prais,  1981).  Furthermore  there  is  currently 
a  clear  reluctance  amoung  employers  to take on  apprentices 
during  a  recession  (Ecpnomic  Tre~ds, September  1980)  ~nd the 
number  o1  craft  and  technician apprentices going  into the 
engineering  industry  in 1981  was  the  Lowest  since 
records  began  (DE,  September  1981).  It is estimated 
that  the  industry's future  needs  would  require  20  000 
apprentices  but  the  intake was  Less  than  12  000. -~-
In  response  to the problem  of  increasing youth  unemploy-
ment  the  Government  has  recently announced  a  package  of measures 
which  are designed to alleviate this problem  while  also providing 
some  basic training.  These  measures  will  ensure that  school  lea-
vers  who  cannot  find  full  time  employment  will  be  offered a  place 
on  a  one  year  foundation  course  which  wilt  include both  on  and 
off the  job experience.  It  remains  to be  seen,  however,  if these 
and  the other existing employment  schemes  will  substantially alter 
the problems  of underemployment  in the  UK  economy  or provide  a  re-
serve of  skilled  labour  which  will prevent  bottlenecks  from  appea-
ring  in  an  upturn. -67-
Competitiveness  and  import  penetration 
The  ability of  domestic  producers  to  compete  on  both  the 
international  and  domestic  markets  is for  a  Large  part  dependent 
on  the price at  which  their  production  is profitable.Non-price 
factors  also  have  a  role to play but  even  when  these are adverse 
a  suitably  Low  relative price  will  act  as  an  offset  in most  cases. 
Movements  in  relative ~xchange rates  do  not  necessarily 
mi~ror movements  in  relative domestic  price trends.  An  examina-
tion of  both  is  required for  the discussion of  the  Level  of  com-
petitiveness.  While  the  exchange  rate  is  immediately  observable 
there  is  considerable debate over  the most  appropriate measure 
of relative price competitiveness  (H.M.  Treasury,  February 
1978).  One  possibility,  used  in  Chapter  II above,is  relative 
prices.  Another  of  considerable  interest  is the  relative trends 
in  costs.  Such  an  indicator  has  the  advantage  of  covering,  for 
manufacturing  industry,  the  costs of production for  exporters and 
for  companies  facing  import  competition  while  it does  not  vary 
with  the degree  to  which  changes  in  costs  are  reflected  in  prices 
or profits.  The  comparison  does  however,tendto be  based  on  mo-
vements  in  labour  costs  rather than  total  costs because  of diffi-
culties of  measurement.  Their  reliability therefore depends  on 
the  homogeneity  of other  input  prices  across  economies. 
Table  IV.20  shows  the  movements  that  have  occurred  in 
the effective exchange  rate and  relative unit  Labour  costs  mea-
sured  in  both  national  and  common  currency  terms (20).  On  ave-
rage prior to 1978  the  faster  growth  of  Labour  costs  in the  UK 
was  more  than offset  by  th~ depreciation of  the  exchange  rate 
so  that  in  1977  relative unit  Labour  costs  in  the  UK  meas~red in 
a  common  currency  were  some  11,6 % below  their 1970  level.  Since 
1977  there  has  been  a  sharp  deterioration  in  the  UK's  competitive 
(20)  These  figures  are calculated as  a  geometrically  weighted  ave-
rage  of the  UK's  competitors'  exchange  rates  and  unit  labour 
costs. -68-
position.  The  effective exchange  rate appreciated  by  17,6% be-
tween  1977  and  1981  while  at  the  same  time  relative unit  labour 
costs  rose  by  34,2 % resulting  in  an  increase  in unit  labour  costs 
in  foreign  currency  terms  of  57,8 %.  Although  competitiveness  has 
improved  somewhat  in  1981,  the ground  which  must  now  be  recovered 
or offset  by  non-price  factors  is still immense. 
Research  findings  (Enoch,  1978>,  suggest  that  in the past 
there  was  a  relatively  long  time  lag  between  changes  in price  com-
petitiveness and  export  performance  (perhaps  up  to  four  years) 
but  more  recent  evidence  points to a  shortening of this  lag.  The 
impact  on  imports  is felt  much  more  quickly.  The  current  low  le-
vels  of  demand  however  mask  the extent  to  which  this  loss  of  com-
petitiveness  is  leading  to  increased  import  penetration  (21) .while 
the performance  of exports,  which  have  shown  a  remarkable  buoyancy 
in  the  face  of  the  recession  in  world  trade,  may  not  yet  be  re-
flecting  the full  effect of  the price and  cost  movements. 
The  extent  of  import  penetration  has  been  a  recurring 
theme  in  discussions  of  the British economy  over  the past  twenty 
years  (see  Chapter  II  and  related tables).  Table  IV.21 
shows  that  over  the  last ten years  the growth  rate of total  im-
ports  and  total exports  have  been  broadly  similar but  within  man-
ufacturing  exports  have  grown  at  only  half the  rate of  imports. 
Prior to  1978  this  increase  in  the  share of the domestic  market 
for  manufactures  going  to foreign  competitors  cannot  be  fully 
explained  by  price movements  and  econometric  research  has  typi-
cally found  an  income  elasticity of  demand  for  imports  in  excess 
of  unity. 
(21). Trade  figures  for  the  period  since  September  1981  (following 
a  six  month  period  for  which  no  data  is available  because 
of an  industrial  dispute)  show  a  strong  increase  in  import 
volume  compared  to the  level  in  early  1981. -69-
Two  broad  schools of thought  have  developed  to explain 
this phenomenon·  of  increased  import  penetration and  th~y give  rise 
to distinctly different  policy prescriptions.  The  first  is  re-
presented  by  the  Cambridge  Economic  Policy  Group  (Godley, 1979 
and  Cambridge  Economic  Policy  Review,  April  1980)  whosee,  on  the 
continuation of  current  free  trade policies, no  end  to the 
displacement  of domestic  manufactured  goods  by  imports  and  con-
sider  that the resulting  balance of payments  difficulties will 
enforce  further  deflation on  the  economy. 
On  the other  hand  the  London  Business  School  (Beenstock 
and  Warburton,  1980)  argue  th.at  the  liberalisation of world trade 
in  the 60's  and  70's allied to the  UK 1s  accession to the  Commu-
nity  in  1973  has  led to a  once  and  for  all shift  in  the openness 
of  the  UK  economy  which  has  allowed  greater  international  specia-
lisation to occur.  When  the  full  effects of this changed  inter-
national  environment  have  worked  through  they  suggest  that  the 
growth  of  import  penetration  will  revert  to the trend  Levels 
evident  in  the  SO's  and  early 60's. 
It is not  clear  which  of  these  schools  of  thought  is  sup-
ported by  the  interpretation given  by  Manison  (Manison,  1978)  to 
a  NEDO  study  (NEDO,  1977>  which  showed  that  unit  values  of  UK 
exports  within  most  product  groups  tend to  be  lower  than  those 
in  countries  such  as  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and  France 
while  the  reverse  is true for  imports.  Manison  argues  that  this 
is evidence  that  the  UK  is slipping  downstream  in the product 
cycle  and  is producing  cheaper,  Less  sophisticated goods  which 
are  more  susceptible to  low-cost  competition.  This  appears·to 
be  consistent  with  the finding  of  the Maldague  Report  CEEC, 
1979). 
Studies of  the  sophistication of  UK  exports  have  typically 
concentrated on  the manufacturing  sector  and  overlook  the  compe--70-
titive strength of  UK  service  industries.  These  industries  have 
produced  substantial  $Urpluses  on  the  invisible trade  account 
despite the growing  debt  repayments  on  foreign  held  assets asso-
ciated with  the exploitation of  North  Sea  oil. Structural economic  problems 
Structural trends 
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Growth  in the  economy  is not  a  homogeneous  process.  An 
economy  with  a  heavy  concentration of  slow  growing  industries  can 
expect  to suffer a  relatively  Low  aggregate  rate of growth  in the 
short  to medium  term.  In  addition,  the  achievable  rate of growth 
will  depend  on  the adaptability of  the  economy  to  change, which  is 
in part  dependent  on  the  rate at  which  resources  can  be  switche·d 
from  sectors  which  are  in  relative decline to those  in ascendancy. 
Table  IV.22  compares  the productive structure,  in  terms  of 
value  added,  of  the  UK,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and  Commu-
nity economies  and  the  changes  that  have  occurred between  1973  and 
1979.  The  figures  for  the  shares of  value  added  between  sectors 
show  that  the  UK  has  a  relatively  large service sector  accounting 
for  nearly  60  % of total value  added  compared  with  Germany  (52  %) 
and  the  Community  as  a  whole  (54%),  while  the manufacturing  sec-
tor is appreciably  smaller,.in particular  in  those branches  prod-
ucing  capital goods. 
The  comparison  of  short  run  sectoral performance  between 
economies  is  complicated  by  cyclical  influences;  nevertheless the 
relatively poor  UK  economic  performance  is  reflected  in  much  Lower 
growth  rates  than  in  the .community  in all sectors except  fuels  and 
power  and  services.  At  a  Community  level  these  were  the only  sec-
tors  to  exhibit  above  average  growth  rates  while  within manufac-
turing only  chemical  products,  office machines,,and electrical 
goods  experienced growth  rates  above  that  for  the  economy  as  a 
whole.  Within  UK  manufacturing, value added  in the  chemical  pro-
ducts,  office machines  and  rubber  and  plastic products  branches 
grew  more  quickly  than  the  average. 
Compared  with  growth  rates  by  sector  in  the  Community 
as  a  whole,  only  in  the fuel  and  power  and  market  service sectors, 
and  in the office machinery  branch  were  growth  rates of  value -72-
added  greater  in the  UK  over  the period.  In  the  fuel  and  power 
sector this  can  largely be  explained  by  the  build-up  in  the  ex-
ploitation of  North  Sea  oil. 
Given  this  background  it is  instructive to  compare  the 
UK  and  Community  sectoral  experience  more  systematically.  Des-
pite the  rather aggregative nature of  the available  data the 
"shift-share" technique,  which  has  been  widely  used  in  analysing 
regional  economic  performance, appears to be an appropriate analy-
tical tool for such a comparison.  The application of this technique 
involves  calculating the difference between  the  actual  change  of 
value  added  in  the  regional  economy  (UK)  and  the  change  that 
would  have  occurred  in  each  industry if it had  experienced the 
same  growth  rate  as  the overall  economy  (EC-6).  This  difference, 
which  is designated "net  relative change",  is then  disaggregated 
into that part  which  is due  to the difference between  the  sec-
tors'  growth  rate  ( EC-6)  and  the overall  economy  ( EC-6), and that 
part  which  is due  to a  below  or  above  average  CEC-6)  performance 
of  the  industry  in  the  region  (UK).  These  two  aggregates  are 
known  as  the "structural" and  "differential"  components  respec-
tively.  A large  negative  (positive)  structural  component  is ta-
ken  to  indicate a  weak  (strong)  economic  base  while  a  large dif-
ferential  component  indicates that particular factors  are at 
work  in  the  regional  economy. 
The  results of  this  exercise are  summarised  in  Table 
IV.23.  It appears  that  although the  structure of  UK  manufactu-
ring  industry did  have  a  negative  influence  on  the  relative 
growth  performance  between  1973  and  1979, this seems  to  have  been 
more  or  less offset  by  the positive  influence of  the  large ser-
vice sector  (22).  The  differential  compenent  is negative  in  all 
(22)  Because  no  breakdown  of the service sector into branches  is 
available, it cannot  be  discounted that  structural  influences 
within  the  service sector  were  negative. -73-
cases  except  fuel  and  power  products  and  office machines.  The 
conclusion  can .therefore be  drawn  that  the  factors  leading  to 
the  UK's  poor  performance  tend to be  peculiar to the  UK  and  not 
the  result  of  a  heavy  dependence  of the  UK  economy  on  industries 
which  are  declining  throughout  Europe.  This  conclusion  should 
be  considered as  tentative as  it remains  to be  tested with  a 
more  disaggregated breakdown  of economic  sectors;  moreover.the 
analysis  cannot  take  account  of differences  in  the  type  and  qua-
lity of  output  of  sectors  across  economies. 
Table  IV.24  gives  a  sectoral  breakdown  of  investment 
rates,  employment  change  and  productivity growth  between  1973  and 
1978.  The  investment  figures,  as  was  discussed  in  the  section on 
investment,  at  a  more  aggregated  ~evel, show  that  fixed  capital 
formation  as  a  share of value  added  in  manufacturing  tends  to be 
close to both  the  German  and  Community  figures.  Notable  excep-
tions are  in  the  areasoftransport  equipment,  office machinery  and 
rubber  and  plastic products,  the  last  two  of  which  were  identif-
ied  as  having  above  average  growth  rates  in  the  UK.  Despite 
experiencing  lower  overall  growth  between  1973  and  1978  than  in 
Germany, employment  in  the UK fell slightly les quickly.  For  example 
in  branches  facing  severe  economic  difficulties such  as  metal  mi-
nerals  (steel)  a~d textiles_the  UK  has  experienced poorer output 
growth  but  is  shedding  labour,  if anything,  at  a  slower  rate  which 
results  in  a  relative decline of productivity  levels  (23>.  This 
poor  performance  is  found  throughout  industry  with  the  exception 
again,  of  fuel  and  power  and  office machines. 
Table  IV.25,  taken  from  a  recent  OECD  study  on  positive 
adjustment  policies, presents  more  detailed and  up-to-date natio-
I 
(23)  This  slower  rate of  labour  shedding  in  the period up  to 1978 
may  have  been  due  in part  to the existence of  the  Temporary 
Employment  Subsidy, while the severity of  the present  recession 
in  the  UK  may  have  led to  some  catch  up  with other  Community 
countries. -~-
nal  data  for  manufacturing  which  confirm  the  trends  evident  in 
the data discussed  above.  Industries  which  have  experienced the 
biggest  falls  in output  between  the  two  periods  1971-75  and 
1976-80  are  coal  and  petroleum products,  iron  and  steel, ship-
building  and  marine  engineering,  motor  vehicles, textiles and 
bricks, whereas the strongest  rises  have  been  in chemicals,  in-
strument  engineering, and  pottery  and  glass.  Between  the  two 
periods  most  industries  have  experienced growth  in output  per 
head, the main  exceptions  being  coal  and  petroleum products, 
iron and  steel, shipbuilding, and  motor  vehicles,  industries  which 
all experienced  large falls  in  the  level  of output.  Increase  in 
the degree  of  import  penetration  have  been  most  marked  in  instru-
ment  and  electrical engineering,  areas  where  large  increases  in 
output  per  head  were  achieved,  and  in  motor  vehicles, textiles 
and  footwear.  The  biggest  improvements  in export  performance 
were  made  by  chemicals,  electrical engineering,  shipbuilding and 
clothing. 
Assessment 
---------- The  foregoing  description  shows  that  most  sectors  in  the 
UK  have  been  affected by  the overall  slower  growth  of  the econo-
my  compared  with  other  Community  countries.  The  shift share ana-
lysis  suggests that  this  slower  growth  is not  primarily due  to 
the  level  of  concentration of  declining  industries  in  the  UK  eco-
nomy,  although this  is clearly a  problem  i~ some  regions,  but  is 
due  to more  pervasive factors  in  the  economy  as  a  whole. 
The  factors  contributing to this  lower  growth  have  made 
the process of  adapting  the  economic  structure more  difficult 
and  more  painful.  It  is  striking that, despite significant  la-
bour  shedding,  problem  sectors  such  as  metal  minerals,  transport 
equipment  and  textiles have  not  achieved  the  same  output  per 
head  growth  as  in the  rest  of  the  Community.  Only  the effects 
of  North  Sea  oil and  the  relatively small  office machinery  indus-
try  have  given  above  average  performance. -75-
The  effect of the second  oil shock  has  imparted  a  re-
newed  urgency.into the process of  adapting  productive  structures 
both  in  the  UK  and  in  the  Community  generally.  Favourable 
changes  in  the economic  structure of the  UK  economy  require a 
reversal  of the  factors  which  have  led  to  lower  than  average 
growth  rates  in  industries that are dynamic  in other economies. 
These  factors  include  issues· which  have  been  touched  on  else-
where  in this paper  such  as  the  instability of  the economic  en-
vironment,  the  loss of  international  competitiveness  and  the de-
cline in profitability.  Sectoral policy  has  a  major  role to 
play  in  encouraging  R and  D and  technical  innovation  and  in  en-
suring that  an  adequate  supply  of  skilled manpower  is available. 
Attitudes  to technical  change  and  mobility,  which  are difficult 
to  compare  across economies,  are  also  important  in  this  respect. -77-
The  UK  as  an  oil producer 
~!~-~:::~~::_~~~-~~~g~:!!~~ 
Since  1975  crude oil production  in  the  UK  has  been  in-
creasing.  By  1980  output  was  equivalent  to self sufficiency. 
Table  IV.26(i),  which  sets out  details of  production  and  consump-
tion of primary  energy  in  1980,  suggests  that  the  UK  is  today 
self-sufficient  in primary  energy  supplies even  after allowing 
for  the depressing  effects on  consumption  of  the  current  economic 
recession. 
Estimates  of  the  amount  of oil available for  recovery 
from  the  North  Sea  and  from  other  UK  offshore areas  have  been  ad-
justed downwards  in  recent  years.  Tables  IV.26Cii)  and  (iii> 
show  these estimates  as  well  as  forecast  production  levels  up  to 
1984  inclusive.  It  is evident  that  potentially recoverable  re-
serves  should  be  sufficient to  maintain  the  current  rate of pro-
duction  for  between  25  and  50  years.  Thus,  while  allowance  must 
be  made  for  increasing  marginal  costs  of production  and  other 
technical  factors,  foreseen  or  unforeseeable,  inherent  in  the 
harsh  offshore operating  environment, it is difficult  to  accept 
prima  facie,  the  view  that oil production  must  necessarily peak 
in  the  mid  1980's,  as  has  often been  suggested. 
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Current  depletion policy  is  aimed  at  preventing  substan-
tial surplus production  capacity developing  in  the  1980's.  The 
authorities believe that  to ensure  security of  supply  up  to the 
end  of  the  century,  it is  in  the  national  interest  to flatten 
out  the  level of oil production  from  the  North  Sea.  This 
implies  that  account  is taken  of  likely output  levels  from 
fields  already  in  production,  in  decisions to develop  more 
recently  discovered  fields;  e.g.· development  of the  Clyde 
Field has  been  delayed  by  two  years.  The.current  economic 
downturn  and  the  slow  rates of  growth  foreseen  also  mean  that -78-
the amount  of oil which  the  UK  needs  to  be  self-sufficient  is 
not  likely to grow  much  over  the next  few  years. 
It has  been  suggested  that this approach  : 
Ci>  fails  to maximise  the present  value  of the discounted flow 
of  revenue  which  could  be  obtained  from  the profits of 
immediate  high  production  levels  and  the resulting  tax 
revenues; 
Cii>disrupts the  cash-flow  assumptions  made  by  the oil  companies 
when  deciding  to explore  for  and  exploit  particular oil 
fields  and  acts as  a  disincentive to future oil exploration 
and  development  by  these  companies. 
The  weight  to be  given  to these  arguments  depends  upon 
assumptions  about  the  future  price of oil. It  is notable  that 
exploration and  appraisal  activity  in  the North  Sea  picked  up 
during  1980  (24>  reflecting the effects of the  second  oil  price 
shock  in  1979. 
Further  support  to  current  depletion policy is given 
by  official estimates of  the  UK  energy  balance  up  to the year 
2000  released  in  the  latter part of  1979  <Financial  Times, 
October  1979>;  these  figures  ~uggested that  on  the  basis of 
current  policies, by  the  end  of the century there will  be  a 
shortfall  in  domestic  primary  energy  production  of between  50 
and  100  million  tonnes  of  coal  equivalent. 
Since  the  UK  authorities have  not  insulated domestic 
energy  prices  from  world  prices it is unlikely that this cautious 
approa.ch  to the exploitation·of  recoverable oil  resources  will  have 
(24>  Drilling starts in 1980  were  25  %above  those  in  1979  and 
applications  for  the  latest  <seventh  round>  of  licensing 
reached  record  levels. -79-
been  a  disincentive to develop  other energy  sources,  or to  con-
tinue with  vigorous  energy  conservation  measures.  Indeed  a  recent 
study  (Morel,  NIESR, August  1980)  finds  a  clear  relationship be-
tween  the  relative  real price of  various  sources  of  energy  and 
the share of these  fuels  consumed • 
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Table  IV.27  shows  recent  developments  in  the  Community 
oil market.  Oil  imports  have  been  reduced  considerably,  reflec-
ting energy  saving,  a  depressed  economy  and  the  rapid  increase  in 
crude  oil production within the EC.  The  latter is  substantially due 
to  UK  production  which  in  1981  is expected  to be  around  20  % of 
gross  inland  EC  consumption  of  crude  oil and  oil equivalents. 
About  half  UK  crude oil production  in  1980  was  exported 
and  nearly  60  % of these exports  went  to other  EC  Member  States, 
mainly  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  <see  Table  IV.28).  This 
emerging  interdependance  within  the  EC  is significant  for  the 
jncreased security of supply  it provides  and  it reinforces 
Community  arrangements  which  require member  countries to hold 
minimum  levels of oil stocks • 
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The  main  macro-economic  effects of  North  Sea  oil are 
summarised  below 
- The  additional  value  added  created by  North  Sea  oil production, 
in which  the profit element  is  substantial gives  rise to  in-
creased tax  revenues  (see  Table  IV.29).  The  remainder,  mostly net 
profits, accrues  largely to non-resident oil companies.  Despite 
the  high  levels of  taxation it is clear that  returns  from  the 
North  Sea  oil  investment are presently muc.h  higher  (25) 
than  would  have  been  obtained from  investment  in  the domestic 
economy. 
(25.)  The  safeguard provisions  of the  Petroleum  Revenue  Tax  CPRT) 
allow  for  a  remission  of  tax if the  rate of  return should 
fall  below  30  %. -80-
- By  producing  all its own  oil the  UK  avoids  the need  to ex-
change  non-~il exports  for  oil  fmports.  Indeed  as  the  real 
price of oil  rises, other  industrial  countries  without  oil 
require greater amounts  of non-oil  exports  to provide  a  given 
level  of oil  imports;  with  North  Sea  oil the  UK  can  postpone 
these pressures.  France  and  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
had  total oil bills  in  1980  equivalent  to  4%  and  3%  of  GOP 
respectively  while  the  UK  has  a  positive balance of  trade  in 
oil  (see  Table  IV.30). 
- Partly as  a  result  of  increased  North  Sea  oil production  the 
international  value of  sterling  has  appreciated.  It  is  very 
difficult  to put  a  numerical  value  on  this effect  although 
most  commentators  think  rather  less than  half  the  apprecia-
tion of  the  real  exchange  rate since 1978  can  be  attributed 
to oil. 
In  evaluating  the overall  impact  of  these  factors  it is 
necessary  to  consider  the  dynamic  aspect  of  the  economy.  Thus 
developments  will  be  influenced  by  existing trends,  Government 
policies, and measures  taken  to absorb  and  utilise the  revenues 
accruing  from  oil production. 
It  has  been  argued  that  the  UK's  move  towards  self-
sufficiency  in oil  supplies  is bound  to be  accompanied  by  struc-
tural  changes  elsewhere  in  the  economy,  in particular by  a  con-
traction of  manufacturing  output,  prqvoked  by  an  appreciation 
of  the sterling exchange  rate  (Forsyth  and  Kay,  Fiscal  Studies, 
1980>.  However,  others  have  suggested that  such  an  adjustment 
is  by  no  means  inevitable  (Worswick,  NIESR,  November  1980)  and 
have  pointed out  that  there  are other  ways  in  which  the economy 
could  develop,  given  appropriate fiscal  and  monetary  policies. 
Nonetheless,  some  of  the  recent  fall  in  manufacturing  output 
(see Table  11.4)  is clearly attributable to the effects of  North 
Sea  oil acting through  the  higher  exchange  rate for  sterling, -81-
although  the  long-run  decline  in  the  share  of manufacturing  in 
GDP  is a  phenomenon  s~en in  many,  though  not  all, advanced 
industrialised countries  in the  last  25  years and  was  clearly 
evident  in the  UK  throughout  the 1970's. 
The  UK's  move  towards  oil self-sufficiency has  postponed 
the need  for  the type  of structural  changes  required  in  non-oil 
producing  countries where  additional  exports must  be  generated to 
meet  the  increased oil bill.  The  finite character of the offshore 
reserves nevertheless  suggests that  steps  should  be  taken  to 
transform  its windfall  nature  into a  permanent  increment  to 
national  income.  One  way  in  which  this  could  be  done,  is for  the 
UK  to enjoy  a  higher  rate of  economic  growth  now  that  the previous 
constraint  of the adverse pre-oil balance  of payments  position 
is gone.  For  example  the Cambridge  Economic  Policy Group 
(Cambridge  Economic  Policy Review,  April  1981)  has  argued  that 
a  strong  pound  is not  necessary  for  fighting  inflation and  that 
the effects of North  Sea  oil have  been  wasted  by  the failure to 
expand  domestic  demand.  It is  important  however,  that  the pattern 
of  demand  should  be  appropriate  since it is clear that,  in  so  far 
as  increased oil output  has  led to an  appreciation of  sterling, 
this  in  turn  has  permitted a  rise  in private consumption  at  a 
time  when  output  and  investment  were  declining  (see  Chapter  II, 
especially Table II.4).  However,  a  strong  pound  encourages 
enterprises to be  more  efficient and  has  also made  the  liberalisa-
tion of  exchange  controls easier permitting a  considerable growth 
in  net  investment  abroad  <see  Table  II.14);  in this way  the  UK 
has  been  able  to exchange  present oil output  for  external 
assets which  will  provide  income  streams  to  contribute to the 
balance of  payments  in  future  years. -83-
Table  IV.1  Fixed  investment  in  GOP,  1958-1980 
% of  GOP  and  ratios 
UK  D  EC-9  UK/EC-9 
1958-67  17,3  24,8  21,5  0,80 
1968-72  18,6  24,8  22,5  0,83 
1973  19,7  24,5  22,8  0,86 
1974  20,5  21,9  22,4  0,92 
1975  19,7  20,7  21,3  0,92 
1976  19,2  20,7  21,1  0,91 
1977  18,3  20,8  20,7  0,88 
1978  18,1  21,5  20,7  0,87 
1979  17,7  22,7  21,0  0,84 
( 1980)  17,5  23,7  21,3  0,82 
1973-80  18,8  22,1  21,4  0,88 
Sources  Eurostat  and  Commission  staff. T
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Table  IV.~  Real  rates  of  return  on  trading assets,  1962-1980 
Industrial & Commercial Companies  Manufacturing 
companies 
Pre-tax  real (a) Post-tax  real (b)  Pre-tax  rate of 
rate of  return  rate of  return  return 
"  " 
% 
1962-1967  10,9  6,8  10,1 
1968-1973  9,3  6,3  8,3 
1973  9,0  8,1  8,1 
1974  6,0  6,0  4,3 
1975  5,2  3,9  3,9 
1976  5,6  5,4  4,1 
1977  6,7  6,8  5,8 
1978  6,7  6,3  6,0 
1979  5,0  6,1  3,6 
1980  3,0  3,2  2,0 
1973-1980  5,9  5,7  4,7 
(a)  Net  operating  surplus  on  UK  corporate activities,  i.e. gross 
operating  surplus  less  capital  consumption  at  current  replace-
ment  cost,  excluding  North  Sea  oil activities. 
(b)  Bank  of  England  estimate 
Sources  British Business,18-24 September  1981; Bank  of  England 
Quarterly Bulletin. T
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Table  IV.5  Gross  fixed  capital  formation,  retirements  and  gross  capital  stock 
at  1975  prices  and  replacement  cost 
uKL  •ooo  ~;lliOft 
Gross  domestic  fi- Retirements  at  Gross  capital  % change 
xed  capital  forma- 1975  prices  stock  at  1975  re- in gross capital 
tion t  million  at  placement  cost  stock 
1975  prices 
1973  21  195  5  022  444  300  3,6 
1974  20  567  5  195  459  100  3,3 
1975  20  416  5  580  473  400  3,1 
1976  20  649  5  964  487  400  3,0 
1977  20  161  5  777  501  000  2,8 
1978  20  836  6  453  514  600  2,7 
1979  20  898  6  773  528  100  2,6 
1980  20  761  6  520  541  600  2,6 
Sources  HMSO,  Economic  Trends  and  Commission  sta1f. -88-
Table  IV.  6  Public  expenditure on  research  and  development,  1973-1978 
UK  D  EC-9 
Public  R & D expenditure  as 
a  % of  GOP 
1973  1,25  1,23  1,05 
1974  1,32  1,21  1,03 
1975  1,29  1,24  1,04 
1976  1,36  1,17  1,02 
1977  1,21  1,07  0,95 
1978  1,05  1,12  0,95 
Composition  in  1978  (%  of tot  aU 
Exploration  and  exploitation of 
the  earth  1,0  2,0  2,0 
Planning  of  the  human  environment  2,3  3,1  3,4 
Health  2,7  5,5  5,4 
Energy  8,1  13,6  11,6 
Agriculture  3,9  2,1  3,7 
Industry  4,8  7,6  8,2 
Social problems  1,1  4,6  3,2 
Space  2,5  4,2  4,4 
Defence  52,1  12,2  22,3 
General  promotion  of  knowledge  20,5  45,1  35,5 
100  100  100 
Total  expenditure  in MEUA  2  540  5  436  14  706 
Source  Eurostat -89-
Table  IV. 7  R &  D carried out  by  industry  in  the main  industrial  countries, 1977 (a) 
Percentages, by  i ndust rial  sector 
USA  D  Japan  F  UK ·(d) 
1.  Electrical machinery  7,8  10,9  3,9  4,3 
2.  Electronic equipment .  12,1  12,9  18,9  22,6  ·----------· ------------ _______________________  ...._ _________  __.. 
3.  Total electrical 
and  electronics ( 1+2)  19,9  23,8 (e)  22,8  26,9 
4.  Chemical,  petroleum  14,0  27,4  19,6  18,3  18,3  etc. 
s.  Aircraft  23,7  7,3 
J 
18,6  18,3 
6.  Transport (including  17,0 
motor  vehicles  and  11,4  12,4  11,9  6,4 
ships) 
7.  Metals,.  instruments  21,0  17,3  19,0  13,8  18,1  and  machinery (b) 
8.  All  other,(c)  10,0  8,9  20,6  14,6  12,0 
9.  Total  intramural 
industrial  R & D  100  100  100  100  100 
expenditure 
(a)  Total  intramural  industrial  expenditure on  research  and  development,  1977. 
(b) Includes office equipment  and  electronic  computers. 
<c>  Includes  other manufacturing,  mining  and  quarrying  and  services  R & D expenditure. 
(d)  Figures  are for  1978. 
(e)  Fo.r  Japan,  total electrical  and  electronics  includes  computers. 
Sources  :UK  Business  Monitor  (MO  14). -90-
Table~  Comparative  labour  productivity growth  rates,  1963-1977 
% change  per  annum 
Total  Economy  Manufacturing 
1963-73  1974-78  1963-73  1973-77 
8  4,3  2,9  n.a.  n.a. 
D  4,3  3,2  5,6  4,5 
F  4,4  2,7  5,4  3,2 
I  5,3  1,0  5,7  1,4 
UK  (a)  3,3  0,9  4,3  1,1 
EC-5  (e)  4,4  2,4  5,3(c)  3,1  (d) 
Japan  8,7  3,3(b)  9,4  4,9 
USA  1,9  .0,2(b)  2,8  1;2 
(a)  Exluding  North  Sea  oil. 
(b)  1974-79 
(c)  1961-73 
(d)  1974-78 
(e)  Weighted  average  of B,  D,  F,  I,  UK 
Source  :  Euro~ean  Econom~, No.  9,  July  1981. -91-
Table  IV.9  Comparative  capital productivity growth  rates, 
1961-1978 
% change  per  annum 
1961-73  1974-78 
8  0  -1,0 
D  -2,0  -2,7 
F  1,0  -1,7 
I  0,2  -1,7 
UK  (a)  -0,5  -2,4 
EC-5 (b)  -0,3  -1,7 
(a)  Excluding  North  Sea  oil 
(b)  Weighted  average  of  B,  D,  F,  I,  UK 
Source  :European  Economy,  No.  9,  July  1981. -92-
Table  IV.1Q(j)  Changes  in population of  working  age, 1977-86  GB(d)  Thousand 
Total  population  of  wor~ing age  (a) 
of  which  men 
non-married  women 
married  women 
aged  16-44 
aged  45-59/64 
of  which 
men  45-64 
women  45-59 
(a)  Men  aged  16-64  and  women  aged  16-59 
1977-81 
+732 
+378 
+552 
-198 
+1  092 
-360 
-169 
-191 
1981-86 
+762 
+437 
+250 
+75 
+1  083 
-321 
-104 
-217 
Table  IV.10Cii)  Components  of  change  in  the  Labour  force,,. 1977-86  GB(d)  Thousand 
1977-81  1981-86 
Population  Activity  Total  Population  Activity  Total 
effect (b)  rate  effect (b)  rate 
effect (c)  effect (c) 
Total  Labour  force  +624  -764  -140  +717  -32  +685 
of  which 
men  +329  -471  -146  +418  -96  +322 
non-married  women  +411  -110  +301  +212  -42  +170 
married  women  -116  -179  -195  +87  +106  +193 
(b)  The  change  in  Labour  force  that  would  have  occured  if the  activity  rate  in 
each  age  group  had  remained  over  the  period  at  its value  in  the  initial year. 
(c)  The  residual  change:total  change  Less  the  change  due  to the population effect. 
Table  IV.10(iii)  :  TotaL  Labour  force  <exc L.  students), 1975-86  GB  (d).  Thousand 
Male  Married  Non-married  AlL 
female  female 
1975  15.796  6.602  3  179  25.577 
1976  15  882  6  742  3 327  25  951 
1977  15  856  6  922  3  349  26  127 
1978  15  807  6  834  3 436  26  077 
1979  15  773  6  754  3  500  26  027 
1980  15  716  6  697  3  576  25  989 
1981  15  710  6  627  3 650  25  987 
1982  15  748  6  578  3  711  26  037 
1983  15  840  6 649  3  769  26  258 
1984  15  925  6  733  3 801  26  459 
198:)  15  986  6  788  3  828  26  602 
1986  16  032  6  820  3 820  26  672 
(d)  GB.  =  UK  less  Northe·rn  Ireland 
Source  :  HMSO,  Em~lo~ment Gazette,  Apr i l  1981 • -93-
Table  IV.11  Activit~ rates  1971-86 - GB 
Per  cent 
Including  sttJdents  Forecast 
1971  1977  1981  1986 
Male 
16-19  98,8  99,0  99,0  99,0 
20-24  98,8  98,9  98,9  98,9 
25-34  97,5  97,6  96,7  97,0 
35'-44  98,3  98,1  97,3  97,4 
45-54  97,6  97,2  95,6  95,2 
55-59  95,3  93,5  90,2  88,7 
60-64  86,6  81,5  69,9  63,3 
65-69  30,6  22;o  13,0  12,5 
70+  11,0  7,5  4,9  4,3 
All  ages  85,8  83,4  80,9  80,4 
Married  female 
16-19  42,4  54,7  50,7  50,9 
20-24  46,7  59,0  57,8  57,7 
25-34  38,4  52,2  50,2  48,6 
35-44  54,5  67,4  66,6  69,3 
45-54  57,0  65,1  66,7  70,6 
55-59  45,5  54,9  51,8  52,9 
60-64  25,2  24,6  19,6  16,8 
65+  6,5  5,0  3,4  2,8 
All  ages  42,3  50,4  48,8  49,9 
Non-married  female 
16-19  97,7  98,0  98,0  98,0 
2Q-24  94,4  92,9  92,9  92,9 
25-34  80,8  79,8  78,4  78,1 
35-44  80,0  77,5  77,7  77,1 
45-54  78,1  77,0  76,3  75,9 
55-59  67,2  64,8  63,2  62,6 
60-64  33,7  25,8  18,5  16,4 
65+  6,3  4,1  2,2  1,6 
All  ages  45,6  50,4  51,0  51,1 
All  female 
16-19  91,7  94,6  94,3  94,0 
20-24  66,0  74,4  76,0  75,6 
25-34  44,0  56,5  55,6  55,4 
35-44  57,4  68,7  68,2  70,5 
45-54  60,6  67,1  68,4  71,6 
55-59  51,1  57,3  54,6  53,3 
60-64  28,2  25,0  19,2  16,7 
65+  6,4  4,4  2,6  2,0 
All  ages  45,5  50,4  49,7  50,3 
Source  :  HMSO,  Emplo~ment Gazette,  April  1981. -94-
Table  IV.12  Activity  rates  by  age-groups  (a)  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
UK  and  EC,  1973-1979 
% 
Age- F.R.  of  Germany  United  Kingdom  EC-9 
groups 
Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female 
1975 
14-19  37,0  32,9  33,1  29,1  28,8  24,7 
2D-24  76,7  68,0  89,6  65,8  78,4  61,4 
25-29  89,0  55,5  96,7  50,0  93,0  50,9 
3D-39  97,5  47,4  97,9  56,8  97,3  45,4 
40-49  97,4  47,8  97,6  67,0  96,2  46,3 
S0-54  94,0  46,1  96,3  64,7  92,5  43,9 
55-59  87,0  37,8  93,9  53,4  85,4  36,2 
60-64  62,4  15,8  84,3  30,4  62,1  19,2 
65-~9  17,2  6,6  31,4  11,1  21,9  7,5 
70+  6,3  2,0  8,8  2,4  6,6  2,0 
1977 
14-19  32,3  28,5  33,1  29,4  26,9  23,2 
20-24  76,7  67,8  89,2  67,5  78,2  63,1 
25-29  87,6  58,4  96,3  52,7  92,3  54,8 
30-39  97,3  49,1  97,5  56,3  96,9  47,8 
40-49  97,5  48,4  97,1  67,5  95,7  47,7 
S0-54  93,8  45,4  95,5  63,9  91,8  43,9 
55-59  86,0  38,9  91,9  56,9  84,2  38,0 
60-64  53,2  13,8  80,1  26,7  56,8  17,8 
65-69  13,8  4,7  27,2  10,9  19,2  6,9 
70+  5,4  1,8  8,1  2,1  6,1  1,9 
1979 
14-19  31,2  27,0  33,2  29,6  26,2  21,0 
20-24  78,5  69,4  89,1  68,3  77,8  63,8 
25-29  87,1  60,1  96,8  44,3  91,7  57,0 
30-39  97,2  51,4  96,6  55,1  96,6  50,6 
40-49  97,3  49,3  96,4  66,7  95,6  48,8 
S0-54  93,7  43,1  94,0  63,3  91,4  43,9 
55-59  83,9  37,6  90,7  53,0  81,4  36,7 
60-64  50,3  14,8  74,3  23,9  54,6  16,8 
65-69  11,7  4,5  19,2  6,6  15,5  5,4 
70+  3,9  1,6  5,1  1,5  4,5  1,6 
(a)  Labour  force  as  a  percentage of  the total population of the  same  age  and  sex. 
Source  :  Eurostat. -95-
Table  IV.13  Estimates  of  overmanning  in  UK  industry  (a) 
'Thousands 
Manufacturin&  Other industry (b)  Private Services C'c ) 
Actual  Predicted  Discrepancy  Actual  Predicted  Discrepancy  Actual  Predicted  Discrepancy 
1973- +  41  +  46 
74 
1974- - 385  - 384 
75 
1915- - 242  - 373 
76 
1976- +  46  - 98 
77 
1977- - 34  - 127 
78 
1978- - 78  - 170 
79 
1979- - 355  - 332 
80 
1973- -1007  -1438 
80 
- s 
- 1 
+131 
+144 
+ 93 
+ 92 
- 23 
+431 
- 65  - 83 
- 48  -191 
- 48  -126 
- 52  - 65 
+  1  +  1 
+so  +  3 
- 28  - 92 
-190  -553 
+ 18 
+143 
+ 78 
+ 13 
0 
+ 47 
+ 64 
- +363 
+  30  -288 
+ 80  -226 
+  51  +  38 
+116  - 67 
+153  +186 
+147  - 48 
+  20  -186 
+603  -591 
+ 318 
+306 
+  19 
+  183 
- 33 
+ 195 
+  206 
+1194 
(a)  The  discrepancy  between  actual  changes  in  employment  and  those predicted 
as  a  function  of  output 
(b)  Construction,  gas,  electricity and  water,  transport  and  communication. 
(c)  Excludes  private professional  and  scientific services. 
Source  :  Cambridge  Economic  Policy  Review;  April  1981,  Vol.  7,  No.  1 -96-
Table  IV.14  Industrial  distribution of  jobs or adults  supported  under  various 
employment  measures  (d),  1975-1979 
GB  Thousands 
Period  Manuf'acturina  Other  Private  Total 
Industries  Services 
Temporary Employment Subsidy  Aua 75 - Mar 79  473.0  28.4 
Small Finn Employment Subsidy  July 78-June 79  68.7  6.3 
Short-time Working Compensation  May 78-Mar 79  8.4 
(textiles, clothing and footwear) 
Temporary Short-time Working 
Compensation  April 79 -June 79  11.7 
Adult Employment Subsidy  Aug 78 - June 79  D.L  D.L 
Job Release Scheme  April 78-June 79  ·n.L  D.L 
Total' (c)  561.8  J4.7 
(a)  Including  5.1  in  agriculture and  mining  and  quarrying. 
(b)  Including  0.2 in  agriculture. 
(c)  excluding  the  Job  Release  Scheme. 
33.8  540.3 (aJ 
7.1  82.2 'CbJ 
8.4 
0.1  11.8 
n.L  1.4 
n.L  42.1 
41.0  644.1 
(d)'  Only  the  "Temporary  Short-time  Working  Compensation"  and  "Job  Release 
S·cheme"  are  now  in effect,  and  both  continue  to accept  new  claims. 
Source  :  HMSO,  Employment  Gazette,  No.  79;  Cambridge  Economic  Review,  April  1981; 
Vo l ume  7,  No.  1 -97-
Table  IV.15  Sectoral  employment  - average  annual  growth  rates,  1960-1978 
UK  % 
1968/  1973/  1978/  1975/  1978/ 
1960  1968  1973  1973  1975 
Agriculture  -3,8  -3,5  -1,7  -3,4  -0,5 
Energy  products  -3,2  -5,1  -0,4  0,1  -0,8 
Industrial  products  -0,5  -1,0  -1,4  -2,3  -0,8 
Intermediate  product  -0,6  -1,2  -1,5  -1,8  -1,3 
Equipment  products  -0,1  -1,0  -1,0  -1,6  -0,6 
Current  consumption  products  0,9  -1,0  -2,1  -3,7  -1,1 
Food  products  -0,3  -0,5  -0,9  -2,2  -0,1 
Construction  and  civil engineering  1,2  0,2  -1,9  -3,4  -0,9 
Market  services  1,1  1,0  0,6  0,7  0,5 
Non-market  serv-ices  1,5  1,5  1,6  3,5  0,4 
Total  0,3  0,1  -0,1  -0,1  -3 
Source  European  Economy,  No.  9,  July  1981. -98-
Table  IV.16Ci)  UK  unemployment  rates,  1975-1980 
as  % of  full  employees 
Year 
Mal~  Female 
All  unemployed  . Excl.School-·  All  unemployed  Excl.  School-
leavers  leavers 
1975  5,5  5,3  2,1  1,9 
1976  7,1  6,8  3,5  3,1 
1977  7,4  7,0  4,3  3,8 
1978  7,2  6,9  4,4  3,9 
1979  6,7  6,4  4,3  3,9 
1980  8,7  8,1  5,7  5,0 
Source  :  HMSO,  Emelo~ment Gazette,  September  1981. 
Table  IV.16(ii)  :  EC  unemployment  rates,  1970-1982 
1970  1979  1980  1981  1982 
8  2,2  8,7  9,3  11,6  12,3 
DK  1,0  5,3  6,2  8,2  8,7 
D  0,6  3,4  3,4  4,8  5,6 
GR  (2,2)  (2,8):  (2,3)  (3,6) 
F  1,3  6,0  6,5  7,8  8,1 
IRL  5,3  7,4  8,3  10,4  10,9 
I  4,4  7,5  8,0  8,6  9,0 
L  0,0  0,7  0,7  1,0  1,2 
NL  1,0  4,1  4,9  7,3  9,2 
UK  2,5  5,3  6,9  10,2  11,3 
EC  2,0  5,5  6,1  7,7  8,5 
Source  European  Economy,  No.  10,  December  1981. -99-
Table  IV.17  Unemployment  by  age  and  sex 
and  for  specific groups  in 
the population at July, 1966, 1973,1980 
GB  (96 of  the relevant population) 
·Males: 
by age: 
schoolleavers 
others under 20 
aged 20-24 
25-54 
55-59 
60-64 
minority groups: ( a ) 
Females: 
by age: 
schoolleavers 
others under 20 
aged 20-24 
25-34 
35-54 
55-59 
manied: 
minority groups: ·(a ) 
1966  1973  1980 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
4 
3 
2 
3 
7 
2 
1 
2 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
32 
12 
9 
s 
5 
11 
7 
30 
11 
6 
3 
2 
2 
2 
4 
(a)  New  Commonwealth  and  Pakistan  :  to May  1980  only. 
Source  :  Cambridge  Economic  Policy  Review, 
April  1981,  Volume  7,  No.  1 T
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Table  IV.20  Indices of effective exchange  rate  and  unit  labour  costs,  1971-1981 
1970 =  100 
Effective  %  Relative  %  Relative  % 
exchange  change  on  unit  labour  change  on  unit  labour  change  on 
rate  previous  costs (a) in  previous  costs  in  previous 
year  national  year  common  year 
currency  ,  currency 
1971  99,5  -0,5  102,4  2,4  101,9  1,9 
1972  95,7  -3,8  104,0  1,5  99,5  -2,4 
1973  85,5  -10,6  104,3  0,3  89,2  -10,3 
1974  82,5  -3,5  110,8  6,3  91,5  2,5 
1975  76,2  -7,6  128,7  16,2  98,2  7,3 
1976  65,0  -14,8  137,3  6,6  89,2  -9,1 
1977  61,9  -4,8  142,8  4,0  88,4  -0,9 
1978  62,6  1,1  151,3  6,0  94,6  7,1 
1979  66,6  6,4  166,0  9,7  110,5  16,7 
1980  73,0  9,6  188,3  13,5  137,4  24,4 
1981 (b)  72,8·  -0,2  191,6  1,8  139,5  1,5 
% change  -38,1  +42,8  -11,6  1970-77 
% change  +17,6  +34,2  +57,8  1977-81 
(a)  Unit  labour  costs  in  national  currency  by  reference  to the  weighted  average 
for  main  competing  countries~ 
(b)  Forecast  based  on  information  available  at  mid-September. 
Source  :  Eurostat  and  Commission  staff. - 104-
Table  IV.21  Volume  of  UK  manufactured ·exports  and  imports,  197D-1980 
Change  over  preceding  year  (%) 
Exports  Imports 
1970  0  8,3 
1971  10,4  9,2 
1972  1,2  18,3 
1973  15,1  20,2 
1974  4,0  5,9 
1975  -2,9  -6,5 
1976  9,0  9,0 
1977  8,3  11,0 
1978  0,8  12,4 
1979  0  14,7 
1980  0,9  -1,3 
1970-1980  4,5  9,1 
Growth  rate of total  exports 
6,5  4,7  and  imports,  1970-1980 
Source  British Business T
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Table  IV.25  Changes  in output,  employment,  productivity  and  trade performance  by 
manufacturing  industries,  1971-1980 
Sector  1975=100  Per  cent 
(Weight  per  1,000)  Expory  output  Employ- Output  Impor/ 
ment  per  head 
Home  demand  Home  demand 
plus  exports  plus exports 
ALL  MANUFACTURING  1971-75  103  104  98  17  17 
( 1  000)  1976-80  102  95  107  20  20 
Food, drink and tobacco  1971-75  100  103  97  18  4 
( 110)  1976-80  105  96  110  16  5 
Coal & petroleum pro- 1971-75  112  104  108  14  11 
ducts  1976-80  102  98  104  13  13 
( 13) 
Chemicals  1971-75  100  100  100  17  25 
(82)  1976-80  115  101  114  20  30 
Iron  &  steel  1971-75  117  103  114  11  13 
(50)  1976-80  96  88  109  16  16 
Non-ferrous  metals  1971-75  108  109  100  30  15 
( 17)  1976-80  105  99  106  32  19 
Mechanical engineering  1971-75  96  103  94  17  32 
( 132)  1976-80  92  95  97  20  35 
Instrument engineering  1971-75  93  193  90  29  35 
( 17)  1976-80  104  96  109  35  37 
Electrical engineering  1971-75  96  104  93  19  22 
(95)  1976-80  107  96  113  25  29 
Shipbuilding  and  1971-75  98  101  98  47  16 
marine  engineering  1976-80  84  95  88  29  25 
( 20) 
Motor  vehicles  1971-75  114  108  105  13  28 
(62)  1976-80  99  99  101  26  29 
Aerospace  1971-75  100  100  100  18  32 
(24)  1976-80  94  94  101  21  32 
Other  vehicles  1971-75  102  99  103  14  60 
(11)  1976-80  102  103  99  22  53 
Metal  goods  nes  1971-75  104  104  101  8  12 
(66)  1976-80  97  97  101  11  15 
Textiles  1971-75  108  111  98  17  19 
(57)  1976-80  96  91  105  24  23 
Leather goods  1971-75  105  104  101  20  20 
(4)  1976-80  92  92  100  28  20 
Clothing  1971-75  98  108  92  15  8 
(26)  1976-80  101  94  108  22  14 - 109.-
(Continued) 
Sector  1975=100  Per  cent 
(Weight  per 1,000> 
Export~  output  Employ- Output  Impor~ 
ment  per  head 
Home  demand  Home  demand 
plus exports  plus exports 
Footwear  1971-75  104  112  93  19  9 
(9)  1976-80  99  93  107  28  11 
Bricks & cement  1971-75  109  114  96  3  6 
(24)  1976-80  93  92  101  4  8 
Pottery & glass  1971-75  98  102  96  12  22 
( 16)  1976-80  107  96  112  14  22 
Timber  & furniture  1971-75  104  103  100  26  3 
(36)  1976-80  99  97  102  26  5 
Paper  & board  1971-75  121  105  116  48  6 
(9)  1976-80  112  93  120  50  8 
Other paper products,  1971-75  109  103  103  4  7 
printing &  publishing  1976-80  107  96  112  5  9 
(75) 
Rubber  1971-75  104  103  100  9  20 
( 19)  1976-80  112  88  128  13  23 
Other  manufactures  1971-75  102  104  98  12  13 
(26)  1976-80  115  102  113  15  14 
(a)  The  weights  are proportional  to the  distribution of  net  output  in  1975. 
Source  :  OECD,  Special  Group  of  the  Economic  Policy  Committee  on  Positive Adjustment  Pol i-
cies,  CPE/PAPC81>  11,  November  1981. - 110-
Table  IV. 26( i)  United  Kingdom  crude oil production  in  the  context  of  production  and 
consumption  of  primary  energy  :  1980 
million  tonnes  oil equivalent  % of total primary 
energy  consumption 
Production 
Oil 
Coal 
Natural  gas 
Nuclear/hydro 
Consumption 
Oil 
Coal 
Natural  gas 
Nuclear/hydro 
80 
77 
32 
9 
198 
71 
71 
41 
9 
192 
Table  IV.26(ii)  Oil  reserves,  1975-1981 
Official  estimate of  range 
of  recoverable oil  reserves 
1975/78 
3  000  to  4  500 
Table  IV.26(iii)  Oil  production,  1975-1981 
Official  forecasts  of  range 
of  future  production  Levels 
1975/80  1980 
263  80,5 
1978/81 
42 
40 
16 
5 
103 
37 
37 
21 
5 
100 
millions of  tonnes 
April  1981 
2  200  to 4  400  2  175  to 4  350 
millions  of  tonnes 
1981  1982  1983  1984 
80-95  85-110  85-115  90-120 
SJ~rce~  HMSO,  Eneray  Trends,  October  1981,  and  the  Department  of  Energy's  report  on  the 
development  of  the  UK  Continental' Shelf·Cknown  as  the.~~wn Book). T
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Table  IV.  28  Exports  of North  Sea  oil, 1977-1981 
million  tonnes 
1977  1978  1979  1980  C  Ja~~R~ri  L> 
Total  Exports  15,6  23,9  38,9  38,8 
Exports  to  EC  8,0  11,8  22,4  25,1 
Exports  to the  F.R.  of  3,0  6,4  12,0  14,8  4,8  Germany 
Source  HMSO,  Brown  Book T
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Graph  IV.3  Total  R & D expenditure  as  a  proportion of  GOP,  1963-1980 
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Graph  IV.S  World  oil discoveries,  1940-2080  (a) 
n  §DIO 
El030  ....  - c: 'l'UO 
I'll 
~'USO 
:J) 
1ft '1'180 
r 
(I) 
110 
H 
gseo 
• 
110 
CUMULATIVE  DI_SCOVERIES 
(leftha  nd  seale) 
1111 
ANNUAL  USE 
''· ...  : ,  Jlli'righthand  scale) 
lll!jlllllll:illllill'l
1
1 "IIIII II 
II  J'jl 
1000 
YEARS  -
(a)  The  90%  ~robable Future  of Oil.  Ultimate  recoverable oil is 
2900  x 10  barrels  and  the growth  rate  in oil use  is 3,75  X p.a. 
Graph  IV.  6  UK  primary  energy  balance,  1977-2000 
(b)  Incl.  non-energy  (i.e.  chemical  feedstock)  and  bunkers 
(c)  Incl.  renewables 
source  :  Department  of  Energy  Statistics. -121-
V.  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
This  section  summarises  the main  findings  of  the analysis 
and  demonstrates,  in general  terms,  the constraints on  policy, 
but  does  not  make  specific  policy recommendations  since this 
would  not  be  appropriate  for  a  document  of this nature. 
Economic  trends 
The  paper  (Chapter  II)  has  examined  the economic  trends 
over  a  period  of  years and  has  tried to identify the  reasons  for 
the  United Kingdom's  relatively weak  performance  compared  to that 
of  its European  partners. 
In  particular the  rate of economic  growth  in  the  UK  has 
usually  been  below,  and  price  inflation  usually  above  the 
Community  average  (Tables  II.1,  II.2 and  II.3).  Moreover  the 
rate of  price  inflation has  exhibited much  more  variability 
around  its trend than  has  been  evident  elsewhere  <Table  II.4). 
The  discovery and  exploitation of North  Sea  oil  has  had 
a  significant  impact  on  the economy,  in particular as  the build-
up  of  production  coin~ided with  a  dramatic  rise  in oil prices. 
Not  only  do  tax  revenues  arising  from  North  Sea  activities now 
provide  some  6% of all  tax  receipts,  but  the  UK's  self-sufficiency 
in oil releases it from  the need  to export  manufactured  goods  to 
pay  for  oil  imports.  In  comparison,  France  and  the  Federal 
Republic  of Germany  had  total oil bills in 1980  equivalent  to 
4% and  3% of  GDP  respectively  (Table  II.13). 
The  benefit  of oil to the balance of  payments,  in 
conjunction with  firm  monetary  and  fiscal  policies,  which  have 
been  established  since  1979  within the framework  of  the  Medium 
Term  Financial  Strategy  (MTFS>,  helped  to move  the current  account 
into substantial  surplus  :  indeed  the official forecast  is for  a 
surplus of  UKL  6  billion  in  1981.  This  favourable  position 
contrasts sharply with  that  in  most  other  European  economies. - 122-
In  addition  it can  be  argued that  the  MTFS,  which  seeks 
to  lower  the  rate of  inflation by  progressively  reducing  the 
rate of  monetary  expansion,  particularly by  restraining  the 
level of  public  sector  borrowing,  has  helped  to reduce  the 
inflation  rate  <12,0  % in  1981)  towards  the  OECD  average  level 
with  further  falls  into single  figures  in prospect. 
The  reduction  in the public  sector  borrowing  requirement 
to 4,4  % of GDP  in  1981  from  some  5,5  % in 1979  C26)  again 
distinguishes the  UK  from  other European  economies  where,  partly 
as  a  result  of  the  recession,  public  borrowing  as  a  percentage 
of  GDP  has  been  increasing. 
These  successes  have,  however,  been  bought  at  the cost 
of  a  sharp fall  in  output  from  mid-1979  to mid-1981  as  is shown 
by  Graph  II.2.  At  the  same  time  there has  been  a  steep  drop  in 
investment,  a  movement  which  has  shown  a  remarkable  correlation 
with  the downward  trend  in profits  (Graph  IV.1).  According  to 
conventional  investment  measures,  profitability is now  at  a 
historically  low  level,  and  has  undoubtedly  been  strongly 
affected by  the  recent  loss  of  export  price competitiveness, 
of over  50  % (see Table  IV.21),  which  resulted  ~oth from  the 
rapid  wage  inflation  in  1979  and  1980  and  the appreciation of 
sterling.  Both  these  aspects of the UK's  performance  now  need 
to be  countered  through  improvements  in efficiency and  restraint 
in  wage  costs;  there is some  evidence to suggest  that this is 
already occurring. 
Forecasts  for  the medium-term  (see  Chapter  III)  made  by 
independent  bodies,  and  based  on  the assumption  that  the 
Government  will  continue with  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  in 
line with  the  MTFS,  show  a  wide  range  of possible outturns. 
(26)  Financial  years. - 123-
Nevertheless  there  is a  measure  of  consensus  that  there will  be 
a  relatively  slow  recovery  in output,  coupled with  further 
modest  reductions  in the  rate of  inflation.  The  more  optimistic 
forecasts  see  unemployment  stabilising at  around  its current  Level 
while  others  expect  further  increases  <see  Tiable  III.4>. 
Main  economic  issues 
An  examination  of  investment  (p.47)  t~nds to contradict 
the widely  held  view  that  the deficiencies  in the UK's  economic 
performance  stem  from  too  Little  investment.  Although  it is 
true that  total  investment  absorbs  a  smaller  proportion  of  GOP 
than  in the  Community  as  a  whole,  industrial  investment  seems  to 
be  at  a  very  similar  Level.  What  the evidence  does  suggest  is a 
poorer  return  on  this investment  than  elsewhere,  both  in  output 
terms  and  in  terms  of profitability.  However,  following  the oil 
shocks  there  is a  clear  need  for  additional  investment  effort  to 
adjust  the structure of  the economy  to meet  the  requirements set 
by  the change  in  relative prices and  by  new  patterns of  demand. 
The  fact  that  investment  has  fallen  in the  UK  since the second 
oil shock  suggests that  this positive  adjustment  of  the economy 
is not  occurring  as  quickly  as it should. 
An  analysis of sectoral  and  structural trends  (pps.71-75) 
Leads  to the view  that  Low  growth  is not  due  to a  predominance  of 
the  industries  which  are  slow  growing  in an  European  context,  but 
to an  inadequate performance  throughout  British  industry.  This 
conclusion combined  with  the evidence of poor  output  returns 
to  investment  suggests there  may  be  a  misdirection  of  investment, 
and/or  unfavourable  institutional  and  sociological  factors  such 
as  the attitudes, abilities and  practices of management  and 
unions. 
In the  UK  over  10  % of the workforce  is now  unemployed 
compared  with  under  8%  in the Community  as  a  whole  (see  pps.62-63). - 124-
In part  this rapid  increase  in  UK  unemployment  has  been  caused 
by  the  shake-out  of  labour  from  industry over  the course  of 
the  recession,  and  there  is much  anecdotal  evidence that 
overmanning  has  been  substantially reduced,  resulting  in 
significant  productivity gains.  Nevertheless,  the  rise  in 
measured  unemployment  has  been  moderated  by  a  decline  in 
--
activity rates.  Should  this decline  reverse with  an  upturn 
in economic  activity,  which  is clearly possible,  then  the 
impact  of  future  growth  on  unemployment  will  be  that  much 
reduced. 
Conclusion 
In many  ways  the  conditions  for  a  better  relative 
economic  performance  by  the  UK  have  been  improved  in  recent 
years.  In contrast  to most  other  industrial nations,  the 
outlook  for  the current  account  of  the balance of payments  and 
public  sector  borrowing  should  increase  the  room  for  manoeuvre 
in  setting economic  policy,  and  should  not  threaten the  recovery 
in  output  foreseen.  In addition,  the underlying  rate of 
inflation has  been  much  reduced  and  there  is evidence that 
improved  attitudes and  behaviour  by  both  sides of  industry are 
leading  to  increased efficiency.  The  most  important  problems 
now  are  how  to  restore British  industry's  internal and  external 
competitiveness  and  the profitability of  investment,  both  of 
which  are  required to ensure  an  improved  investment  performance, 
facilitating the restructuring  of the economy  so  allowing  a 
sustained  upward  movement  in economic  activity.  As  such  changes 
will  take  some  time,  measures  to alleviate the unemployment 
problem  in  the  shorter  term,  especially  among  young  people  are 
required.  Moreover  there  is evidence that  the  framework  of 
industries'  training  in  the  UK  is  less  well  adapted to the needs 
of  a  modern  economy  than  in  other  Community  countries, and  in 
in particular  in the  Federal  Republic  of Germany.  The  authorities, 
aware  of  these  problems,  have  recently announced  a  set  of  measures 
which  amount  to a  considirable  extension  of  the entire training. 
system. - 125-
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